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THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION AND LABOR LAW
ROBERT

J. AFFELDTjI.

INTRODUCTION.

T IS BECOMING PAINFULLY evident to the majority of
Americans that they no longer are living in a society of atomistic
individuals but within a society of highly organized institutions.
Within the short span of a little more than 40 years America has been
transformed from a mercantile society of small farms into an industrial
society of corporate empires. This new society with its new institutions has shattered the simple framework of the old society and has
shifted the battle for personal freedom from the public, political arena to
the private, industrial arena.
This change of venue for freedom demands more than the adoption of the simple formulation of rights between man and man, and
between man and the state of the old society, for within this new
society, interposed between the individual and the state, stand groups,
all with distinct and conflicting values. The quest for personal freedom within this type of institutional power society calls for a reformulation of the rights of the person to the institution and to the
state. Unfortunately, however, the resolution of this problem of freedom is not simple, for within the community there are segments which
deny that any such problem exists. The unrealistic approach of
denying that economic invasions of personality are taking place within
the industrial arena has obscured and hindered the solution to the
principal crisis of our times - the conflict between personal and
institutional freedoms.
Labor law, more than any other branch of the law, mirrors this
societal conflict. The law of labor relations is actually a misnomer
because this subject is concerned not only with the conflicts between
labor and management but also with the impact upon other institutions.
Its drama is unfolded upon a broad panoramic screen portraying in
every conflict between labor and management the social repercussions
upon the values of at least three other major participants - the employee, the community, the state - plus other religious, social and
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educational institutions. Society can no longer afford to tolerate the
adage of the mercantile society that the law of labor relations is a
private affair.
In terms of freedom and order, the intervention of the law into
the industrial arena has not been a successful venture. Labor law
today borders on chaos; it is riddled with basic inconsistencies and
inherent contradictions which travel to the very heart of the National
Labor Relations Act. It can be said with little exaggeration that the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts have written not in
crooked lines, but in circular lines. To some degree this confusion
is understandable when one reflects that at least five different formal
tribunals are administering the law. But to a great degree this confusion is caused not by the number of tribunals but by the mercantile
viewpoints of the decision makers sitting on these tribunals. For the
most part, they continue to view the law of labor relations as a conflict between management and labor within a private contractual social
process. This attempt to force three-edged social problems into twoedged legal holes cannot possibly succeed, for the abstractions of the
legal process cannot contain the social momentum of the social process.
The social energies generated by the new group society have the
peculiar ability of outstripping the legal syllogism.
This criticism is not meant to imply that the law should not
enter the industrial arena; on the contrary, it is necessary that the
law should intervene in order to insure the co-existence of personal
and institutional freedom. However, the law should re-enter, armed
with three-edged trilateral tools which are designed for a group society
and which are capable of resolving the complex relationship of the
person to the institution and to the state.
Fortunately, within the body of our constitutional and common
law, we possess these tools - the concept of relational interests, the
foremost of which is the right of association. Both the Supreme
Court and the common law courts have recognized and applied these
tools. Congress, too, in the Wagner Act, realizing that the individual
was impotent within an institutionalized society, granted him in the
right of association a relational interest to union support. It is the
contention of this article that, in the most sensitive and bitter phase
of labor relations, the organizational stage, both the administrative and
judicial process, by transforming the right of association from a. relational interest having three dimensions into a bilateral interest having
two dimensions, have perverted the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, permitting enterprise to invade economically the personality
of the employee on three fronts.
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II.
THE WAGNER DAYS -

A. Early Wagner Days -

THE GOLDEN DAYS.

1935-1941.

In this second half of the twentieth century, it is a common
practice for labor scholars to criticize the early National Labor Relations Board for having been too pro-union and too anti-employer.
Most of this criticism is understandable, for there is convincing evidence that if the early Board committed the sin of administrative
activism, it sinned against employers not against unions. But history,
it is believed, will not indict this Board for having harbored any
particular economic theology; instead it will note that its error was
one, of unsophistication, rather than one of indoctrination.
For it must be remembered that the years 1935-1941 were years
of political upheaval, that an old order based upon individualism had
broken down and that a new order based on groupism was struggling
to be recognized. The principal dilemma which confronted the American nation in the thirties was the quest for a social structure which

would contain and preserve both personal and institutional freedom,
and at the same time promote efficient technical production and distribution. State authority -

fascism and communism -

the nation

rejected. In this way by the social ethic replacing the protestant ethic,
with personal freedom and institutional freedom protected from
governmental domination, was the democratic system preserved. The
profound social and legal implications of this change were that the
group replaced the individual as the fundamental unit of our society.'
The rationale for the adoption of this social or group ethic policy
was that the government felt that the ills of the country were caused
by the concentration of too much economic power in the hands of the
few with the result that there was too little purchasing power in the
hands of the many. Congress recognized that the efforts of the many
to acquire benefits from the few resulted in strikes, interfering with
the national interests. It also recognized that the employee of the
twentieth century was no longer the employee of the eighteenth century, that no longer could he appeal to his employer's personal conscience, but now could only appeal to the corporate conscience. The
corporate conscience, however, was no longer the employer's - it was
part of an organization. The employer had become institutionalized.
1. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security States",

10 STAN.

L. Rv.

620, 631 (1958).
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Governmental policy accordingly proceeded not in the direction of
dissolving the large corporations, but of encouraging counter-defensive
strategy. It encouraged isolated individuals to institutionalize, to
form and join labor unions in order to answer the corporation's metallic
voice with an iron voice of its own. In this manner, by encouraging
the countervailing power of private groups, the economy would, the
government hoped, gradually achieve economic balance. The future
would be secure, for the economic state formerly controlled by one
institution, would now be replaced by the collectivist economic state,
controlled by two institutions - capital and labor.
This governmental philosophy was incorporated into the National
Labor Relations Act. This act encouraged group formation, group
treaty-making and group war. It explicitly prohibited employer institutional interference with unionization, although it implicitly permitted employer personal persuasion. It is at this point that the early
Board, perhaps in excesses of zealousness, sometimes confused the
employer's two separate statuses.
The Board's task in administering the Act, however, was an extremely difficult one, for the National Labor Relations Act, perhaps
more than any other New Deal measure, mirrored the deep structural
changes of the new society. At this stage, however, the implications of
this silent revolution Were not understood by most. And others, who
understood its implications only too well, rallied and closed their ranks
for class resistance. The Board's function during these early days became one not only of legal enforcement, but also one of public enlightenment.
Regardless of the times, regardless of the ferment, the Board felt
that it had received an unmistakable and clear mandate from Congress to protect the right of association (organization) and the right to
association (collective bargaining) from employer invasion. This mandate was explicitly contained in a statement of congressional policy:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employ2
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
2. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29

U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
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In section 7 Congress implemented this policy by stating "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."' And in Section 8 Congress declared that "it shall be an

unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
The National Labor Relations Act was silent on the matter of
employer free speech, but the Board felt that since speech was a form
of interference and that Congress meant no interference when it said
no interference, a strict policy of employer containment should dominate its interpretation of the Act. It's policy thereupon became one of
interpreting the Act within its confines, of resolving close conflicts
between employer free speech and unionization in favor of the latter,
leaving any administrative abuses of employer rights to the constitutional review of the circuit courts.5
The spirit of this employer neutrality doctrine of the early Board
was caught by at least one circuit court when it said:
The employer has no more right to intrude himself into the
employees' efforts to organize and select their representatives to
represent them in collective bargaining than the employee would
have to intrude himself into a stockholder's meeting to interfere
with the election of the company's directors who are after all,
representatives of the stockholders for the purpose of collective
bargaining for the stockholders in all transactions relating to the
company's business.'
In this embryonic period of labor relations the Board had little or
no opportunity to refine its thinking on employer speech invasions of
the right of association. For during this period, at least up to 1939,
very few cases containing pure or isolated free speech issues marched
before the Board.7 The majority of free speech issues were carried
up in extreme cases shattered by company unionism, discriminatory
discharges and refusals to bargain. The Board's attitude, however,
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
4. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
5. MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNeR AcT To TAFT-HARTLEY 175 (1950).

6. NLRB v. W. A. Jones Foundary & Machine Co., 123 F.2d 552, 555 (7th

Cir. 1941).

7. Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act, 20 TUL. L. RPv.
469 478 (1946). Reynard, Free Speech Problems in Organizational Activities, 36

TZXAs L. Rzv. 908 (1958).
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toward employer speech was unequivocally expressed in its first annual
report,' where it asserted that the superior economic status of the
employer as an institution had a tendency to make his slightest suggestions coercive and that, although he had a constitutional right to
speak to his employees as a person in a persuasional vein, he must in
exercising this right revert to his status as a person. Since this legal
conundrum, this changing of masks, was a feat few employers could
manage, the majority chose silence as the wisest course.
For the most part, the circuit courts, although aware of the free
speech constitutional problem, saw no invasion of the employer's
constitutional right of free speech in being condemned to virtual silence
in the face of the employee's right of association. Typical of this
judicial attitude was Justice Learned Hand's classic comment in
Federbush v. NLRB :'
No doubt an employer is as free as anyone else in general to
broadcast any argument he chooses against trade-unions; but it
does not follow that he may do so to all audiences. The privilege
of free speech, like other privileges is not absolute; it has its
seasons; a democratic society has an acute interest in its protection
and cannot indeed live without it; but it is an interest measured
by its purpose. The purpose is to enable others to make an informed judgment as to what concerns them, and ends so far
as the utterances do not contribute to the result. Language may
serve to enlighten the hearer, though it also betrays the speaker's
feelings and desires, but the light it sheds will be in some degree
clouded, if the hearer is in his power. Arguments by an employer
directed to his employees have such an ambivalent character;
they are legitimate enough as such, and pro tanto the privilege of
'free speech' protects them; but so far as they also disclose his
wishes, as they generally do, they have a force independent of
persuasion. The Board is vested with power to measure these two
factors against each other, a power whose exercise does not trench
upon the First Amendment.
A few like the Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that employer
speech is privileged even in an environment of unfair labor practices.10
These circuit court attempts to break the neutrality barrier, however,
did not succeed for the Board generally ignored these type of decisions
and continued to apply its economic status theory.
8. 1 NLRB ANN. Rep. 73 (1936) "Apart from discrimination, the most common
form of interference with self-organization engaged in by employers is to spread
propaganda against unions and thus not only poison the minds of workers against
them but also indicate to them that the employers are antagonistic to unions, and
are prepared to make this antagonism effective."
9. NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
10. NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940).
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In these, the early, unsophisticated years, the Board placed no
emphasis upon circumstances, preferring to strike down employer
speeches to assembled employees in the name of coercion and hostility
rather than in the more subtle name of "captive audience.""
Soon after its enactment, legal scholars and decision makers began
to sense the social group dynamics contained in the Act. Before the
statute was passed, labor problems following the individualistic conceptual cast of common law, were always presented to the courts as
two-dimensional problems, representing bilateral conflicts between
individuals or bilateral conflicts between an individual and an institution. Now, for the first time, legal conflicts began to take on the added
dimension of tri-lateral relationships, involving not only the private
right of a person to be free from injury, but also his right not to
have his interest in a third party or institution injured. The Board,
realizing that the right of association was only negatively protected
by the prevention of employer free speech invasion, also recognized,
almost immediately, the positive relational interest of the employees
to information concerning their organizational rights from the union.
For only by this double-barrelled protection, the Board reasoned, could
the right of association be adequately protected.
This new group relational interest, union access to company
employees on company premises, collided with a valued right of the
old order - the constitutional right of absolute control over property.
The question was posed in a series of cases: "Did an employer have
a constitutional right to prevent union organizers from trespassing upon
his property?".
In Harlan Fuel Company,1" the employer, owner of a company
town, evicted union organizers as trespassers when they attempted to
influence his employees within the town. The company defended its
action by asserting that it had a constitutional right to protect its
property. The Board held that the right of association included not
only the right to be free from employer interference but also included
"full freedom to receive aid, advice, and information from others concerning those rights and their enjoyment."'" In thus equating the right
of association with the right to receive information, the Board recognized a new dimension of protection. Accordingly, in this case it
found that the company by evicting the organizers interfered with the
11. Triplett Electrical Instrument Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 835 (1938); Indianapolis
Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 231 (1938); Nebel Knitting Co., Inc., 6 N.L.R.B. 284 (1938);
Harrisburg Children's Dress Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1937).
12. 8 N.L.R.B. 25 (1938).
13. Id. at 32.
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employees' right under Section 7 and committed an unfair labor practice under Section 8(1).
The Board reaffirmed this slight dislocation of property rights in
other cases of the period.'" For instance in Cities Service Oil Company15 the Board said that slight invasions of property rights springing
from the right of association were "damnum absque injuria".
It is quite evident from these cases that the Board felt Congress
meant the right of association to be much more than a sterile right,
much more than the mere right to join a union, which was already
protected before the enactment of the Act. The agency took notice that
the Act encouraged unionization and placed no restrictions on the union
as an institution as it did upon the employer as an institution. It cited
6
congressional records indicating this congressional intent.'
The Board also took administrative notice of the fact that the
vast majority of the unorganized were, as the National Association of
Manufacturers so aptly phrased it, "inarticulate".'
For this class
to make an intelligent choice concerning unionization, knowledge and
information concerning their rights and the benefits of unionization were
indispensable. Therefore, within this new group society where the
institution was beginning to supersede the individual, the Board and
Congress stumblingly created and hazily recognized a new right - an
institutional relational interest - the right to receive information concerning union activities from a group. Although the Board did not
specifically categorize or identify this employee right to information
from the union as a relational interest, it did recognize the right and
protected it, because it felt that the right of association would be a
spurious right unless it was given institutional insulation. This concept of relational interests is not a novel concept in the common law.
As Dean Greene has pointed out, the common law courts have been
protecting these rights for a long period of time under the guise of
property rights.'
It makes little difference as to the ultimate outcome but there is
convincing evidence that the union had an independent statutory right
of communication to provide information to employees. It is true that
Section 7 specifically refers only to employees, but the history and
spirit of Section 7 is not the history and spirit of personal and private
14. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (1941); American Cyanamid

Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 578 (1941); West Kentucky Coal Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 88 (1930).
15.
16.
(1935);
17.

25 N.L.R.B. 36 (1940).
Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25 (1938) (see 79 CONG. Rsc. 7648-60, 7667-70
H.R. RxP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935).

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AxSWZR3 (1947).

Ol

MANUFACTURERS,

THx

CHALLSNG4

AND

THS

18. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rsv. 460, 462-64 (1935).
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rights, but the history and spirit of institutional rights. In any
event, at the end of the Wagner days, the Board recognized two rights
radiating from the Section 7 right of association - the right to be
free from employer interference and the right to receive information
from the union. Its spirit was that the avenues of communication must
be kept open so that employees could be enlightened as to their rights
and so make an intelligent choice concerning unionization.
B. Late Wagner Days -

1941-1947.

In the early forties, it became apparent that the pragmatic New
Deal program had lost its intellectual momentum and was coasting on
the prestige of its former glory. Perhaps more than any other institution, the Supreme Court reflected this faded glory. The early New
-Deal years were easy years for the Court, for it had little difficulty in
supporting legislative leveling measures directed at corporate institutions and in protecting political and civil rights from state invasions.
It had no difficulty in subscribing to the rule of the majority over
the rule of the minority.
The New Deal was but of temporary help to the Court. More
of a crusade than a philosophy, more against than for, it lent
support to the decisions of the Court in the late thirties when
the times called for political and economic leveling, for paring
down unfavorable interests. During this stage the Court acted
as a unit in protecting ill-favored interests, in upholding state and
national legislation, in guarding civil liberties. The minority
opinions of Holmes and Brandeis became the majority opinions.
These years were easy years; these problems were easy problems.
But once this leveling stage passed, trouble came.
New problems of a societal rather than of a partisan sweep
marched before the Court, mixed problems carrying conflicts
between values, between freedom and authority, such as the right
of disobeying the state in the matter of flag saluting, and the
right to picket as an element of free speech. All these and many
others appeared before a court without a jurisprudence, without
a notion of its function in a democratic society. Subtly they
sprang from a new society which cropped up overnight, an aftermath of the New Deal. In this society it is not so easy to distinguish the oppressor and the oppressed. Not in the opinions of
Holmes, not in the opinions of Brandeis were the answers to be
found. Without precedent, the Court faced these problems. With
precedent the Court divided on these problems.' 9
19. See Affeldt, The Labor Bill of Rights; A Bill of Protest in SYMPOSIUM ow"
LABOR-MANAGEMZNT

1961).

RPORTING

AND

DIscLOsuRE AcT op 1959

(Slovenko. ed.
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It was a new society the court faced at the dawn of the forties,
no longer dominated by one economic institution, but by many institutions, the strongest of which was labor and management. The
Economic Man had succumbed to the Sociological Man. Multi-group
tensions and conflicts involving the freedom of the person and of the
institution were the new social problems awaiting resolution. The
greatest threat to personal freedom was not the obvious state or political invasions of personality, but the much more subtle economic invasions of personality by labor and management. The times called for a
reformulation of the relationship between the person and the institution.
They called for a new political philosophy which defined and protected
the rights of the minority from the rule of the majority.
The Supreme Court, however, was ill-equipped to solve this problem. After attempting and failing in Thornhill v. Alabama0 to solve
this institutional-personal right conflict with the outmoded legal tools
framed for an individualistic order, it turned its attention to the
classic case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.21 This case
involved a direct conflict between employer free speech and employee
right of association. The Board found an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice when he had posted an anti-union bulletin and had
made several uncoercive speeches to his employees. The employer in
appealing to the court invoked his constitutional right of free speech.
The Court could have agreed with the Board that these types of
industrial conflicts were not free speech conflicts involving the Constitution. It could have endorsed the Board's neutrality doctrine that the
employer had no legitimate interest in concerning himself with the
employee's choice of a bargaining representative, that institutional
free speech was coercive by its very nature, and even in those instances
where it was not coercive, it still constituted interference which the Act
specifically prohibited. Instead, Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the
Court, ignored these distinctions and held that an employer as an
institution had an absolute constitutional right to interfere with
unionization through the medium of persuasive free speech. "Neither
the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer from expressing its views on labor policies or problems . . . . The employer ...is as free now as ever to take any side it may choose on this
22
controversial issue."
The Court conceded, however, that persuasion may easily melt into
coercion when such speech occurs in a context of other unfair labor
20. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
21. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
22. Id at 469, 477.
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practices or in a hostile environment. In those instances speech loses
its privilege of communication and becomes a verbal act, forbidden by
the statute. "The mere fact that language merges into a course of
conduct does not put that whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power. In determining whether the
Company actually interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees,
the Board has a right to look at what the Company has said, as well

28
as what it has done."

This decision, ambiguous and doctrinaire in its legal rationale,
has suffered much in the ensuing years. Its antiseptic legal prose fails
to hide the poor legal craftsmanship, which failed to show the application of its rationale to the social order. The consensus of opinion
today is that Mr. Justice Murphy and the Supreme Court failed to
24
legally filter this opinion.

A strong argument could be made the Supreme Court did not
decide the case on a constitutional reading, but rather upon a statutory
reading, or more accurately a statutory misreading. Section 8(1)
of the National Labor Relations Act reads: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."25
In reference to this section, however, the United States Supreme Court
said: "In determining whether the company actually interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees, the Board has a right to look
at what the company has said as well as what it has done." 26
By substituting the judicial conjunction "and" for the Congressional correlative "or", by demanding an act plus the speech, the
Court not only changed the language of the Act, but also its policy.
By assuming without discussion that all institutions and persons have
a constitutional right to free speech in any context, by failing to
evaluate the reasons why Congress was legally incompetent to restrict
employer speech when that speech corroded rights which the nation
in a national emergency deemed imperative, the Court lost a glorious
opportunity to define the relationship of the person. to the institution
a legal and social problem which still continues to haunt democratic
freedom to the present day.
It was also unfortunate that this decision, because of its ambiguity, created such a division of viewpoints between the Board and
23. Id. at 478.
24. Cox, Mr. Justice Murphy and Labor Law, 48 MIcH. L. Rxv. 767, 787

(1950).

25. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958) [Emphasis added].
26. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478 [Emphasis
added].
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the circuit courts. Some circuits refused to enforce the Board decisions.27 Even the circuits themselves differed in their interpretation of
the case. Judge Hand of the Second Circuit thought that the employer now possessed an absolute right of free speech ;28 other Circuits,
such as the Third, did not agree:
By referring to the Virginia case, Judge Hand pointed out that
the employer had specifically claimed the privilege of freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. He concluded, therefore, that the Supreme Court in the Virginia case has sustained
that privilege as absolute ... We do not so contrue the Supreme
Court's decision. We are of the opinion that the Supreme Court
intended to indicate and did indicate that communications from
the employer to the employee might amount to coercion but that
it was not clear that the Board had found 29the existence of coercion on sufficient evidence in the cited case.
This clash among the decision makers over the meaning of the
Virginia Electric decision was more than a clash of statutory interpretation; it was a clash in the basic principles of jurisprudence. It
was here at this point in the crossroads that the proponents of the
new order advocating the inherent right of association closed ranks
against the proponents of the old order advocating the inherent right
of employer speech. Both camps read their own values into the
decision.
The Board, temporarily disconcerted by the new totality test,
quickly abandoned its neutrality test with an assist from the Second
Circuit. 0 It announced that anti-union statements not coercive on their
face were unfair labor practices only when they were part of a corecive
pattern. 8 ' In a remarkable display of ingenuity, it adapted the vague
totality doctrine to the facts of industrial life. By a liberal interpretation of circumstances, by skillfully examining the texture and skein
of the speech for its tonal quality and for any discords of coercion,
the agency warned employers that it was not so much the innocuous
content of the speech that mattered, but the impression that the
27. NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1945); NLRB

v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. American Tube
Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943).
28. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
29. NLRB v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 774 (1944).
30. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 774 (1944).
31. 11 NLRB ANN. RiP. 34 (1946); 10 NLRB ANN. RtP. 37 (1945); 9 NLRB
ANN. RiP. 37-38 (1944); 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 29-30 (1943); 7 NLRB ANN. Rip.
43 (1942).
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speech tended to create in the minds of the employees. The result of
this approach, of course, was that the Board still continued to protect
the employee according to its subjective norm - the reaction of the
statements upon the mind of the employee. Since the Board was on
the firing line, it found that it was a relatively simple matter, in the
majority of cases, to discover a hostile or discriminatory employer
act and by combining the act with the speech the Board continued to
protect employees from employer economic invasions.2 This administrative approach drew the intense criticism from many quarters that
the Board was actually applying its neutrality doctrine under a barrage of different words."' The Board, however, continued to find noncoercive speech an unfair labor practice when disfavored circumstances either preceded" or followed the speech, 5 basing its rationale
on the theory that the molecular structure of the speech had been
disarranged by exterior influences.
Perhaps no other Board in the history of the National Labor
Relations Act has been persecuted as the Board of the late Wagner
days. Its opponents have attempted to depict it as a menacing agency
devoted to the destruction, of employer civil liberties. The evidence
does not support this accusation. "The supposed gag of the Wagner
Act is largely an illusion."' The Board during this period committed
itself to the policy of protecting employee free choice and in conformity with the Virginia Electric decision (unlike the earlier Board
which equated institutional persuasion with coercion) permitted unrestricted employer interference through the medium of persuasion.
The Board in its hierarchy of values held that the right of association was an inherent right, not to be invaded under the pretense of
any economic justification or economic excuse. Predictions of possible
economic consequences following unionization were prohibited because of
the possible threat to that right.3 7 The Board confined employer activities
to appeals to the intellect, not to the will, i.e. "So long as the reasoning power of the employee and not his fear is appealed to."3 3 The
32. Kopman-Worachek Shoe Mfg. Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 789 (1946); Kalamazoo
Stationary Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 930 (1946); Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 432
(1945); American Laundry Machine Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 25 (1944); J. L. Brandeis
& Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880 (1944); West Kentucky Coal Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 89
(1944); 11 NLRB ANN. R9P. 34 (1946).
33. Kovar, Re-Appraisal of Employer Free Speech, 3 DE PAul. L. RV. 184, 188,
189 (1954).
34. Matter of Famous-Barr Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 258 (1945); Matter of FamousBarr Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944); Matter of General Fireproofing Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
375 (1944); Matter of Thompson Products, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B. 925 (1944).
35. Matter of Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944).

36. Morgan, supranote 7, at 469.

37. Matter of A. J. Showalter Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 574 (1945).

38. NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944).
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employer during an organization campaign was confined to the sidelines where he could influence; he was not allowed in its midst where
he could control. 9
No limits were placed upon the employer in his endeavor to
enlighten. Offensively, he could intellectually appeal to his employees
42
Deby stating facts; 4 giving his opinion, 41 recording past benefits.

fensively, he could reply to questions or any false charges. 43 His
manner, however, at all times had to be dispassionate, not vitriolic.44
It would now seem quite clear that, under the law in 1946, if an
employer avoids acts of coercion, domination, discrimination and
restraint apart from his oral or written speech; if he avoids threats,
actual or implied, of those types of future action on his part; if he
sees that his supervisors and any others who might be acting for
him do likewise; if he states the right of self-organization clearly
and unequivocally, and promises that there will be no reprisals
if it is exercised; and if he confines himself to the truth, without
passion or prejudice, to clear statements of his opinion; he can
say almost anything he chooses about the unions or union leaders
and can advise his employees, either generally or in specific
detail. This statement of the rule does contain big ifs, the
compliance with some of which may be difficult to insure, but by
making certain that his own heart is clean and that the attitude of
his entire management group is spotless in the matter of the rights
he can do as
of the workers under them, it would appear that
45
much talking and honest selling as he cares to.

It was during this period, the dying days of the Wagner Act, that
the Board decided the celebrated case of Clark Brothers Company4
from which sprung the "captive audience" doctrine. The Board held
that it was a per se violation of Section 8(1) for an employer to address
his employees on company time and property. It asserted that employee freedom of choice contained in Section 7 was the heart of the
Act. To economically compel employees to attend an anti-union speech
violated this freedom, this right not to receive information and so
constituted an economic invasion of their personality which the Act
meant to prevent.
39. Wennononah Cotton Mills Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 143 (1945).
40. See generally, Daykin, The Employers Right of Free Speech under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 37 IOWA L. REv. 212 (1952).
41. Barber Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 235 (1945).
42. Daykin, The Employer's Right of Free Speech in Industry under the National
Labor Relations Act, 40 ILL. L. Rzv. 185 (1945).
43. Id.
44. Agar Packing and Provision Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 738 (1944).
45. Morgan, supra note 7, at 521, 522.
46- Clark Bros. Co.. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss1/2

14

Affeldt: The Right of Association and Labor Law
FAL.L

1961 ]

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

Also during this period the right of employee communication concerning union activities came into conflict with the property rights of
the employer to control his plant. This clash of plant police powers
with the right of association met in the Peyton Packing Company case.47
The company promulgated and enforced a broad no-solicitation rule
against its employees "while on the property of this company, or while
working on company time."4 8 The Board, overruling the trial examiner
who found for the company, held that this type of no-solicitation rule
was invalid. Looking to future conflicts, the agency laid down guides
following the line of general assumptions; (1) The employer must
justify any restriction infringing upon the employees' right of association even during working hours. (2) While there is a presumption in
favor of any no-solicitation rule during working hours, there is also
a presumption against any no-solicitation rule during non-working
hours. (3) Any attempt to evade these presumptions by the enactment of an invalid no-solicitation rule is an unfair labor practice under
Section 8 (1).
This administrative philosophy of presumptions was applied in the
49 and LeTourneau
Republic Aviation Corporation
Company50 cases,
where the companies in defiance of the Board's evaluation suggestions,
applied broad no-solicitation and no-distribution rules on company property, respectively. The Board ordered the companies to rescind these
rules.
Most circuit courts upheld these no-solicitation rules. The judicial
rationale, though solidly based on the priority of constitutional property rights and plant police powers, was legally encased in such phrases
as "employer business motive,"' "plant efficiency" 52 and "lack of any
' 53
discriminatory motive."
In Republic Aviation Corporationv. NLRB,54 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the presumption philosophy of the Board,
rather than the constitutional philosophy of the circuit courts. It held
that plant rules outlawing solicitation and distribution of literature by
employees on company premises during non-working time is a direct
violation of Section 8(1). It unequivocally rejected the company's
anti-discriminatory motive defense - that the no-solicitation rules had
47. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
48. Id.
49. Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1943).
50. LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944).
51. Midland Steel Products Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1940).
52. Boeing Airplane Co., Wichita Division v. NLRB, 1140 F.2d 423 (10th Cir.
1944). Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946).
53. NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942).
54. 324 U.S. 793 (1945), reversing 143 F2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944) and enforcing
54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944).
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always been in existence and were uniformly applied to all organizations. It also rejected the company's argument that no showing was
made in the record by the employees that the rules interfered with
employee communication. On the contrary, the Court, taking a cue
from the Board, in placing a higher value upon the inherent right of
association over mere inconvenience to property control, placed the
burden of proof for nullifying the rule upon the employer. Of significance in these decisions is the fact that the Court deferred to the
superior knowledge of the Board in evaluating the proper channels of
industrial relations communication. It recognized that the Board must
apply the Act "in the light of the infinite combinations of events which
might be charged." '5
In two other important cases, the Supreme Court upheld the
Board in its recognition and protection of employee institutional relational interests. In Stowe Spinning Company56 the Board ordered the
company, the owner of a company town, to allow a union organizer the
use of its meeting hall. A lodge to whom the company loaned the
building had consented to its use by the union but revoked its promise
upon company order. The union, unable to find other accommodations,
protested against this discriminatory treatment. The Board and the
Supreme Court agreed with the union."7
In Lake Superior Lumber Company, 8 the employer permitted the
union to visit the employees in the camp hall at stated times. The
union, feeling this was ineffective, asked the company for permission
to visit the men in the bunkhouse. The company refused. The Board
relied upon the Supreme Court dictum in Republic-LeTourneau where
the Court said that access must be permitted where "union organization must proceed upon the employer's premises or be seriously handicapped." 5 The Supreme Court in this decision upheld the Board.60
III.
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT.

After World War II a rash of serious strikes rocked the major
industries in America. In 1947 the national temper was short; its
mood extravagantly hostile toward labor. Clamors for a return to
individualism, to freedom of contract for employees and freedom of
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946).
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
70 N.L.R.B. 179 (1946).
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799.
336 U.S. 226 (1942).
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enterprise for employers unfettered by the restraints of collective bargaining rented the Washington scene. Industrial spokesmen argued that
since labor had become a powerful private government seriously competing on equal terms of power with industry, it should assume equal
obligations and responsibilities before the law. At no time since the
early twenties was the national mood so conducive to the passing of
legislation protecting the employer and the public from the ravages of
labor organizations.
The 80th Congress, dissatisfied with the Board's application of
its subjective-totality test, began in 1946 to amend the Act. The House
of Representatives, favoring a contextual test, passed a resolution which
provided that no employer speech would be evidence of an unfair labor
practice unless the speech contained "by its own terms" 6' a threat of
force or economic reprisal. The Senate bill attempting to deep-freeze
Virginia Electric said that no unfair labor practice would result "if
such statement contains under all the circumstances no threat." 2 It
made no reference to rules of evidence.
Compromise was finally reached in conference63 when the phrase
"by its terms" was deleted from the House bill and the phrase "promises of benefit," a part of the Senate bill, was added. The final version,
Section 8(c) read:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.64
This free speech provision, apart from the exclusionary evidence
rules, does not appear, at least from its language, to differ much from
the substance of the Virginia Electric decision. It is clear that Congress placed its imprimatur upon persuasive speech, allowing the employer to express his views, arguments and opinions. It is also clear
from the legislative history that Congress swept away the Board's
neutrality and captive audience doctrines. But apart from this, very
little is clear. The language and legislative history of Section 8(c)
65
obscure and confuse rather than clarify.
61. H.R. RxP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess; 8 (d) (1947).
62. S. RPp. No. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (c) (1947).

63. H.R. Rtp. No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1957).
64. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c) (1956).
65. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61

L. Rv. 1, 16-20 (1947).
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Professor Cox, one of the leading authorities in labor law, at the
time of the Act's enactment predicted that Section 8(c) would neither
change the scope of employer speech nor the Board's totality doctrine.
The amendment will not require any substantial change in the
Board's present policy on the free speech question. .

.

. But with

these exceptions, Section 8(c) merely supplies a statutory foundation for current practice and prevents a return to the former
view. The sponsors of the provision recognized this in the
debate.66
Although there is considerable ambiguity, it would seem that the
Board should continue to apply this doctrine, at least in a limited
form. Section 8(c) itself contains nothing to suggest that in
determining the presence of a threat or promise the Board is to
shut its eyes, to extrinsic circumstances and look only to the naked
words. In the labor field, as elsewhere, language takes on its
meaning from its context. Thus, if a mill superintendent made a
speech to employees stressing the disadvantages of union membership and expressing the hope that a majority would refuse to
join, his words would contain only the mimimum, ineradicable
impression that he might use his power favorably to those who
accepted his views and unfavorably to those who rejected them.
But if the superintendent had just discharged the two most ardent
supporters of the union, he would be understood by almost everyone at the meeting to be threatening further reprisals."'
He felt, however, that the exclusionary evidence provision contained in Section 8(c), which prevented the Board from considering an
employer's speech as evidence of an unfair labor practice, would have
the most damaging effect on labor relations."'
In many cases the employer's state of mind is the determinative
factor, for here, as often in the law, the privilege to engage in
conduct crossing the interests of others depends on the purpose
for which the conduct is undertaken. In such cases expressions,
desire or opinion will often indicate the motive of otherwise
ambiguous acts, and normal rules of evidence permit proof of the
actor's declarations to show his state of mind. For example,
testimony that a plant manager made vituperative attacks on a
local union and expressed the hope that the plant would never
be organized, shortly before discharging two experienced workers
who had become its president and vice-president, would be evidence of his state of mind, and if admitted, would sustain, if it
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 16, 17.
AQ T.

AZ
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did not compel, a finding that he made the discharges in order
to rid the plant of active union men. But Section 8(c) reverses
the familiar rules and forbids the Board to admit the testimony. 9
There was one predominate theme running throughout the TaftHartley hearings; one theme which appeared and reappeared, in point
and counterpoint, from the halls of Congress to the borders of the
nation, and that was the theme of "equality of obligation. '7 0 It was
a new cry in a new era, for this was the first time that Congress was
called upon to democratize and equalize the relations between institutions. 7 '
In essence, then, Section 8(c) was a defensive measure. Congress,
irked at institutional freedom of speech upon the part of unions and
alleged institutional restrictions upon the part of employers, sought to
equalize this relationship by providing employers with an equal right
of free speech. After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendment, the
employer had a right of free speech, Section 8(c), commensurate with
that of the union, Sections 7 and 8(a) (1).
IV.
EARLY TAFT-HARTLEY-1947-1953.

The first problem to be resolved by the Board after the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act was whether Section 8(c) had changed the
test for the determination of an employer unfair labor practice from the
subjective test (the reaction of the speech upon the minds of the
employees) to the objective test (the mechanical examination of the
speech, apart from its context). Three possible theories revolved
around the question of whether the Board could consider prior acts of
the employer in determining whether his technically uncoercive speech
was in reality coercive. 2
The mechanical-term theory holds that since Congress forbade
the Board to use a non-coercive speech as evidence for judging the
purpose of another unrelated act the Board must employ the same
rationale in determining the nature of speech itself. A speech is
coercive only if the barbs of coercion are contained within its own
69. Id. at 19.
70. Mnias &

(1950).

BROWN,

FROM

THE

WAGNER

AcT aTo TAPT-HARTLEty

288-296

71. Id. at 655; Daykin, The Employers' Right of Free Speech under the TaftHartley Act, 37 IowA L. R9v. 212 (1952).
72. Speaking of section 8(c) shortly after its enactment, the NLRB stated: "This
section appears to enlarge somewhat the protection previously accorded by the

original statute and to grant immunity beyond that contemplated by the free speech
guarantees of the Constitution. ..

."

13 NLRB ANJ_ Rip- 40 (1AoR)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 2
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

7: p. 27

terms. Circumstances shedding light upon the words which may
reveal coercive signals are to be ignored. The legislative history of
Section 8(c) does not seem to support this theory since the House
draft containing the language "by its own terms" was rejected by
Congress.
The course of conduct theory is broader than the mechanical-term
theory and narrower than the totality theory. It regards a non-coercive
speech as an unfair labor practice when the speech and act fuse together, approaching a state of identity. "Words and conduct may be
so interwined as to be considered a single coercive act."1 78 The Board
illustrated this course of conduct theory by referring to an employer
anti-union speech immediately followed by a poll asking the employees
whether he, the employer, should "step out completely and let the
business go on its own power."74 The Board held that the speech and
the poll constituted a threat that the employer would close down his
business if the employees voted for the union.
The totality doctrine considers all the circumstances, the employer's anti-union predispositions, his labor record, plant environment,
etc., in determining the effect of an employer's speech upon his employees. Its norm is subjective, mirroring the employees' reactions
rather than objective, mirroring the mechanical purity of the words.
The Board, in initially approaching Section 8(c), adopted the
objective test, fluctuating between the first two theories. It refused to
consider non-coercive statements as violations of the Act because the
employer at other times had committed other unfair labor practices.
Eventually, however, it resorted to a modified subjective test. In
I. S. Abercrombie Company, it said: "The substance and context of
the statement, and the position of the speaker in relation to his
audience, are equally, if not more significant factors in determining
whether a statement is free from any threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit."'7 6
Professor Daykin summed up the Board's modified totality doctrine during these years:
While the Board has modified the totality of conduct doctrine
much weight in determining interference is placed upon the
circumstances under which speeches are made or letters distributed to the employees. The Board has stated that it would
be impossible to appraise fairly and adequately the acts of employers without viewing the entire situation. Consequently in
73. Id.
74. Alliance Rubber Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 514 (1948).
75. Tygart Sportswear Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 613 (1948).

76. J.S. Abercrombie Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 524, 530 (1949).
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determining the legality of speeches, the Board focuses attention
upon such factors as the substance and context of the statements,
the position of the speaker in relation to his audience, the objectivity in approach and moderateness of the language of the
speech, the timing of the speech, the isolated character of the
remarks, the absence of additional acts of interference, and the
anti-union
context in which a promise or a threat is made in a
77
speech.
Perhaps this change in Board approach was influenced by the
circuit courts who refused to accept the narrow approach. 78 Some
held that only unrelated speech could not be used as evidence, while
others saw no change at all affected by Section 8(c),"9 holding that
it was no more than a "restatement of the principles embodied in the
First Amendment."
The Seventh Circuit, realizing that a literal application of the
mechanical term test or a narrow application of the course of conduct
test would not only contradict but destroy the corresponding rights of
association in Section 7 and protected by Section 8(a) (1) said:
It also seems clear to us that in considering whether such statements or expressions are protected by 8(c), they cannot be considered as isolated words cut off from any relevant circumstances.
...When ...we consider the relation of the parties,... related
statements and events and the background of the employer's
actions, we may find that the statement is a part of a general
pattern which discloses action by the employer so coercive as to
entirely destroy the employees' freedom of choice and action.
To hold otherwise would nullify the guarantee of employees'
freedom of action and choice which Section 7 of the Act expressly
provides. Congress in enacting 8(c) could not have intended tiat
81
result.
In respect to the second problem posed by Section 8(c), i.e.,
whether non-coercive statements could be used as evidence of subsequent unfair labor practices, the Board was fairly consistent in refusing to admit them. In cases where motive was in issue, the Board
refused to admit the employer's non-coercive statements as evidence.8 2
77. Daykin, The Employers' Right of Free Speech under the Taft-Hartley Act,
37 lowA L. Rev. 212, 240 (1952).
78. NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 810 (1950); NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills Co., 175 F.2d 675 (5th
Cir. 1949) ; NLRB v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 167 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1948).
79. Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953);
Pittsburg S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd. 340 U.S. 498
(1951).
80. NLRB v. LaSalle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949).
81. NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d 822, 828, 829 (7th Cir. 1949).
82. Consumers Co-op. Refinery Ass'n. 77 N.L.R.B. 528 (1948); Carpenter Steel
Co.. 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (104R • 11 NTR1 Amm Pit. AoMA MoARI
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Even the National Association of Manufacturers, commenting upon
this question of evidence, admitted that a literal construction "obviously would impose a harsher rule of evidence even than existed under common law rules in criminal cases."" 3 In certain instances, however, where the speech and conduct were temporarily related, the
Board and courts admitted employer non-coercive speech as evidence
4
of anti-union conduct.1
Our labor relations statutes reflect to a great extent the consistently
bitter conflict between the two institutions of labor and management
for control of the individual person. One institution offers him
security, the other, freedom; one appeals to his sense of justice, the
other to his sense of loyalty. The Wagner Act was based upon the
underlying thesis that the interests of the union and unorganized
employees were identical or at least similar. The Taft-Hartley Act
through Sections 8(c) and 8(b) (1) rejected this identity of interest
theory. 5 It released the employee from the legal embrace of the union
and made him a legal orphan. Congress thus gave the two institutions
an equal opportunity to convince the employee that he should adopt it
as his legal stepfather. " 'The employee is now . . . in the position of
a customer about to buy an article with both the union and the
employer competing for his allegiance, trade, and support.? ,,8
This new congressional doctrine - that unionization was now a
part of company affairs - the Board accepted. It privileged many
statements which would have been illegal under the rationale of preTaft-Hartley days. It resulted in the emancipation of the employer
from his position on the side lines offering persuasive suggestions and
comments during a union campaign and propelled him into its midst
as an active candidate. He now was at liberty to do more than influence; he could take sides and attempt to control. He could argue that
a vote for the union was a vote against the company, 87 that the employer's and the employees' welfare would best be served by a vote
against the union, 8 and that he opposed unions and collective bargaining" because unions courted economic disaster" and endangered
83. National Association of Manufacturers Law Digest 66 (1947).
84. Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953);
Southern Desk Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1956); Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 1403 (1950).
85. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV.
L. Rzv. 1, 45 (1947).
86. Id. at 46.
87. Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1950).
88. Tennessee Coach Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949); Wrought Iron Range Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 487 (1948).
89. Sunray Oil Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 942 (1949); Bailey Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 941
(1948).
fn
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job security.91 Also the Board allowed the tone .of the election campaign to change, permitting the company to disparage unions and
profane their leaders.9 2
With the exception of these employer inroads upon the right of
association, explicitly dictated by the Act, the early Taft-Hartley
Board continued to administer the Act in much the same policy
vein as the previous Board. It continued, although more liberally, to
confine employer interference with unionization to persuasion. Also, it
continued to apply its modified subjective test in determining whether
the content of the employer's speech was coercive. The tendency of
the employer's statements to arouse fear or promise of benefit was the
legal barometer for measuring coerciveness, not the employer's motive
in delivering the speech nor the employees' actual response to it. The
Board refused to tolerate invasion of the right of association based
upon economic motivation tests or upon other hierarchal theories of
justification or excuse because it regarded the right of association as an
inherent right.
The test of interference is not the employer's motive or whether
the coercion succeeded or failed to materialize its objective; the test
is whether the employer engaged in behavior which may reasonably
be interpreted to coerce or have a tendency to coerce employees in
their self-organizational rights. The Board has considered it
illegal per se to question employees about their union activities and
views. Because such questioning is illegal per se the legality of
such behavior is not determined by motivation.93
The Board in the interests of truth and objectivity allowed the
employer to predict or prophesy that the impact of unionization upon
his company would be detrimental to its future existence. In this
area, however, where it was extremely difficult to distinguish between
employer economic motives and employer anti-union motives, between
economic predictions and veiled threats, there existed a strong Board
presumption that employer predictions were employer threats. 94 The
employer could overcome this presumption by proving from the circumstances, the substance and context of his speech, his relationship to his employees, and other environmental factors that his motive was based on economic facts and not on anti-unionism. The Board
found interference where the employer predicted that if the union won
91.
Co., 82
(1949).
92.
93.
94.

Tennessee Valley Broadcasting Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 895 (1949); Russell Mfg.
N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949); Morristown Knitting Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 342
Daykin, supra note 77, at 239.
Id. at 240.
See supra note 76.
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the election, he would sell his business, 95 discontinue it,96 or that he
would be unable to carry out his projected expansion plan because he
would be unduly hindered by the union.97
The Board emphasized matter above form; it closely scrutinized all
implied or veiled threats. When an employer asserted that it would be
less costly to close his plant than to bargain with a union,9 8 the Board
held it to be a threat to close down his plant. In another instance, where
an employer stated that if the union won, he would be less zealous in
securing additional work, the Board held that he threatened his employees with less work and less pay. 9
The granting or promising of benefits by an employer to his
employees in "the normal course of business" was permissible. However, at no time could an employer grant or promise to grant benefits
in order to defeat unionization."' 0 He could not justify interference by
alleging that he acted in the name of higher business or economic
motives. For instance, he could not justify raising his employees'
wages to the same level as that promised by the union on the basis of
meeting competitive conditions.10 ' There existed a broad presumption
that any benefits promised or granted during a union campaign or on
the eve of an election were promised or granted to defeat unionization.' °2

The Board entertained a very liberal and flexible policy in regard
to the laws of agency. Its underlying thesis was one of fixing responsibility on the employer for the acts of his agents notwithstanding
the employer's absence of knowledge or his protest that the agent had
disobeyed his instructions. The Board, applying the principle of apparent agency, held that the employer could only escape liability by
proving that he had exercised his affirmative duties by attempting to
halt and disavow the illegal behavior.
The Board found the employer liable for illegal activity
when his
0
3
supervisors circulated anti-union petitions,
questioned employees
about union affairs,' 014 and threatened employees with loss of jobs, 10
even though the employer was not aware of his supervisors' actions.
95. Peoples Motor Express, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1947).
96. NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1948).
97. NLRB v. Beatrice Foods Co., 183 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1950).
98. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 800 (1948).
99. Dinion Coil Co., 96 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (1951); B & Z Hosiery Products Co.,
85 N.L.R.B. 633 (1949).
100. Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1948).
101. Mathews Lumber Co., Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 322 (1951).
102. D. H. Holmes Ltd., 81 N.L.R.B. 753 (1949). See also Daykin, supra
note 77, at 227.
103. Kentucky Util. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 845 (1948).
104. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 88 N.L.R.B. 892 (1950).
1fA:

;

rfpiAPr

Q2 TT._R_ i R01 (1950.
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Employers were also held responsible when their foremen' 06 and
workleaders'0 7 engaged in this activity.
It was also possible for an employer to be liable for his employees'
illegal actions. When a non-supervisory employee attempted to influence another employee to sign an illegal anti-union petition in the
presence of the employer, and the employer did not disavow his employee's action, the Board found the employer responsible.'0 8 The
Board reached the same result when an employer, aware that an employee originated a rumor that the company intended to move from the
locality upon the advent of the union, took no action to disassociate
himself from the authority of the employee's forecasts.10 9
Ordinarily, an employer was not responsible for anti-union conduct upon the part of interested factions within the community." 0 If,
however, he was aware that certain groups, such as businessmen and
newspapers,"' were engaging in such conduct on behalf of himself, he
had to immediately disengage himself from such conduct by disavowing it.
In the interval between the Board's decision in the Clark
Brothers case, in which it denounced captive audiences as per se
violations of the Act, and the Second Circuit's review of that decision,
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act. Perhaps influenced by the
Act, the Court disagreed with the Board's holding that an employer
had no right under any conditions to speak to his assembled employees during working hours. The Court suggested that perhaps
the employer did not have an absolute right to speak, but he had a
conditional right which was satisfied by granting the union's request
for a reply to his speech. "An employer has an interest in presenting
his views on labor relations to his employees. We should hesitate to
hold that he may not do this on company time and pay, provided a
similar opportunity to address them were accorded representatives of
the union.""' 2
The Board, however, now that the Taft-Hartley Act was law,
ignored this suggestion, abandoned its captive audience doctrine (now
permitting the employer to address his employees without union
participation) and retreated from this area of conflict for the next
106. Chamberlain Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1948).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Efficient Tool & Die Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 170 (1948).
E. B. Law &Son, 92 N.L.R.B. 826 (1950).
Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949).
Empire Pencil Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1949).
Wayline, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 511 (1949).
NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
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four years." 8 Only in General Shoe Corporation,"4 concerning the
matter of elections, did the Board show signs of militancy. In that case
it declared, since it had exclusive control over election procedures, that
the technical 8(c) rules governing unfair labor practices would not
pertain to elections, but that more liberal rules protecting employee
free choice would prevail. Critics contended with much merit that
this Board maneuver flouted the congressional will as expressed in
Section 8 (c), but no one seriously contended that the Board could not
legally take this position.
In 1951, the Board, without warning, suddenly resurrected the
equal time suggestion thrown out by the Second Circuit Court in the
Clark Brothers case. In Bonwit-Teller, Incorporated,"' the employer,
a department store, enforced a privileged no-solicitation rule which
prohibited all solicitation upon the selling floor during working and
non-working hours. This type of rule was legally permissible because
of the nature of the business, i.e. a retail store. The employer, however, taking advantage of this rule, made an anti-union speech to his
assembled employees during working time six days before a scheduled
election and refused the union's request for a reply. The Board voided
the election and found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice
upon two grounds: first, upon the narrow rationale that he had discriminatorily applied the rule in favor of himself, a candidate in the
election; and second, upon the broader rationale that he had violated
the rights of the employees under Section 7 of the Act - their right to
hear both sides of the story before exercising their freedom of choice.
The Bonwit-Teller rule would have been of little significance to
labor relations if it had been confined to its facts and its narrow
rationale. But in the very next case, 116 involving an employer of an
industrial concern who had made a captive audience speech in the
absence of any no-solicitation rules, the Board held that the principle
of equal time applies to all arenas, regardless of the existence or
non-existence of no-solicitation rules. It was now obvious to all
that the Board intended to rely upon its broad rationale and that the
Bonwit-Teller rule had now become the Bonwit-Teller doctrine.
The Board's philosophy was centered on the fact that it regarded
employee freedom of choice concerning unionization to be the matrix
of the Act. Before that choice could be intelligently exercised, it was
113. S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950) ; Babcock

& Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
114. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
115. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
116. Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
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necessary that the individual employee be enlightened as to the advantages and disadvantages of unionization by both the union and the
employer. Since the thrust of the Act was directed to this freedom
of persuasive communication and away from coercive communication,
the Board protected the employees' right to union information as an
institutional relational interest. It also protected the employer's right
to convince employees of the disadvantages of unionism, but the Board
originally disfavored speeches before a captive audience because it
felt that the employer had overstepped the bounds of persuasion and
violated the Act's policy by taking advantage of his superior economic
position in order to force employees to listen to speeches which ran
against their right of free choice as protected by Section 7. After
the nactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, with its legislative
history clearly indicating congressional disapproval of the Board's
captive audience doctrine, the Board, in order to preserve and
effectuate the policy of the Act, which had not been amended, reversed
its position from that of requiring that an employee had a right of
receiving no information to that of requiring that he had an obligation
7
under Section 7 to receive all information.'
Its policy therefore became one of according both the union and
the company an equal opportunity for freedom of speech. It regarded both as conditional, interdependent rights, both inextricably
connected to each other. Its function as a board, it felt, was to maintain this delicate balance, to prevent one right from becoming absolute
so as to destroy the other right and hence to pervert the Act's policy.
It translated this policy of equal communication to the factory community by directing that these commensurate rights use the same
industrial microphone - the plant forum during working hours.
Our finding is supported ... by the realities to be found in union
organization campaigns. Thus, it is apparent that printed materials and individual solicitations neither reach the full audience
that the employer can insure by his control over working time
nor do they approach the persuasive power of an employer's oral
presentation. Soliciting employees on the employer's premises,
even when not precluded by a no-solicitation rule, cannot substitute for the systematic arguments presented orally to an employee assembly. Soliciting employees off the premises can seldom
be extensive, due to both time limitations and geographical diffusion of employees."'
117. Mittenthal, Employer Speech - A Life Cycle, 5 LAB. L.J. 101 (1954) ; Note,
Limitation upon an Employer's Riqht of Non-coercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV.
1037 (1952). See also Chanin, Development of a Free-Speech Policy in Industrial

Relations, 9 LAB. L.J. 14 (1958).
118. Metropolitan Auto Parts, 102 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1636 (1953).
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The Bonzuit-Teller doctrine did not fare well in the circuits. The
Second Circuit upheld the narrow rationale but rejected the broad
rationale.
If Bonwit-Teller were to abandon that [no-solicitation] rule, we
do not think it would then be required to accord the Union a
similar opportunity to address the employees each time [the employer] Rudolph made an anti-union speech. Nothing in the
Act, nor in reason compels such 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a tooth' result so long as the avenues of communication are kept
open to both sides.11 9
Justice Swan, in dissent, prophesied the future when he held that
the employer had an absolute right to non-coercive speech by virtue of
Section 8(c). This right, he said, was privileged and unconditional and
always applied notwithstanding the breadth of any no-solicitation rules.
The Board, however, continued to apply the Bonwit-Teller doctrine "despite any dicta or views to the contrary which may be found in
the decision of the court of appeals in the Bonmit-Teller case."'0
When the Second Circuit again warned the Board to discard its
broad rationale, it became apparent that dark clouds were drawing in
knots for the inevitable storm.
It soon became evident that the Board was beginning to have
second thoughts concerning the invalidity of no-distribution rules. A
hint of this shift in attitude came in Newport News Children's Dress
Company,12 1 where the Board upheld a no-distribution parking lot rule,
distinguishing it from LeTourneau on the basis that the rule did not
interfere with the relational interest of communication because distribution was possible elsewhere. In Monolith Portland Cement
Company, 2 the Board acknowledged that the presumption once favoring the right of association over property control had now shifted
to one favoring plant cleanliness and order over distribution. In this
case the Board upheld a company no-distribution "in-plant" rule, saying
that distribution was possible in the parking lot.
It had now become evident that the presumption theory of the
Peyton Packing Company case concerning the invalidity of no-distribution rules during non-working time had been reversed by the
Board. Now it was incumbent upon the union to carry the burden of
119. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied
345 U.S. 905 (1952).
120. Metropolitan Auto Parts, 102 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1635 (1953).
121. 91 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1950).
122. 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951).
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proof, to show unusual conditions or insuperable obstacles to communication in order to nullify such a rule. 2 3
A highly important case of first instance came before the Board
during these years. In Marshall Field & Coinpany,1 the Board held
that union organizers had the right of access to the non-selling closed
areas of the store. The Board realized that the geographical obstacles
were not comparable to lumber camps or company towns, but felt that
because of the privileged no-solicitation rule and the irregular relief
periods, a sufficient impediment existed so as to seriously interfere with
communication. In the first decision of its kind, the Board recognized that the union right of access was not simply a derivative right
proceeding from the employees' relational interest of information, but
an independent right of its own.
The Seventh Circuit, feeling that solicitation was not sufficiently
impeded overruled the Board.125 The court also did not agree with
the Board in terming the union right of access as an independent right,
for it distinguished the rights of employees from the rights of nonemployee union organizers.
.V.
TAFT-HARTLEY TODAY-1953-1961.

In 1953 under the impact of a new administration in Washington,
the Board experienced the most radical change in personnel and
philosophy since its inception. 22 The new "Farmer Board," after
1
voicing its discontent with the previous Board's policy approach, 2
proceeded to "reinterpret" the Act, sometimes subtly, sometimes
brutally, in a spirit strongly reminiscent of pre-Wagner days.
It became apparent from the beginning that the new Board differed
from its predecessor not only technically but philosophically, in interpretation of basic policy and the hierarchy of values, which went to
the inner fabric of the Act. The Wagner and early Taft-Hartley
Boards, interpreting the Act within its confines, viewed the right of
association as the primary right in the scale of values. The Farmer
Board, interpreting the Act from without its confines, stretching toward the Constitution, viewed employer free speech and property
123. Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property -

Property Rights, 47 Gzo. L.J. 266,288 (1958).
124. 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952).
125. Marshall Field v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).

4 Discussion of

126. Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer
Persuasion,"49 Nw. U.L. Rkv. 594 (1954).
127. See Address of Chairman Farmer at the University of Tennessee, Nov.

6, 1953, in 33 LAB. RX.. RsiP. 53 (1953).
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rights as the primary rights, relegating the right of association to a
secondary position in its scale of values.
The Board articulated this shift in its hierarchy of values by
proclaiming that it considered free speech and property rights as
absolute rights, not conditional rights. It discontinued the prior Board's
practice of balancing these rights against each other. It now evaluated
them, giving a legal presumption of validity to plant police powers.
This change of Board policy also effectuated a radical change in
the nature of the test employed in determining an unfair labor practice. The Wagner Board in ascertaining whether an employer speech
breached employee rights relied upon a subjective test, emphasizing
the tendency of the speech to influence the employees' free choice. The
Taft-Hartley Board, while allowing more employer latitude of expression, adopted the middle "course of conduct" rule, a modified
subjective test. The Board of 1953 discarded the subjective test and
adopted the objective test. In determining whether an employer speech
was an unfair labor practice, the new Board regarded the reaction of
the employees as irrelevant. Under this new test, it was only necessary to isolate the employer's statements from their context and if
they contained no direct or explicit threats or promises of benefits, the
speech was legitimate. The emphasis was now placed upon employer
128
action, not employee reaction.
Today, eight years after the launching of the Farmer Board,
a semi-sophisticated employer can frustrate his employees' free choice
in many ways. He can appeal to their fears, avarice, ignorance, and
prejudices. Through an unrealistic and technical application of the
laws of agency, he can enlist the aid of employees, supervisors, and the
community in accomplishing this objective. This state of affairs, to
say the least, is confusing especially when one considers that Congress
has not amended the policy of the Act, i.e. to protect employee
freedom of determination in regard to their rights of association and
collective bargaining.
Section '8(a) (1) guarantees employees "freedom from fear" in
exercising their freedom of determination set forth in Sections 7 and
9(a). It is theoretically an unfair labor practice for an employer to
take advantage of his economic power by threatening to remove his
operations if employees form or join a union. In these cases, his
anti-union motive is clear. The Board, however, following the previous
Board's policy, has held that an employer has a right to predict or
prophesy the economic consequences of unionization emanating from
128. B.M.C. Mfg. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 823 (1955).
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impersonal market forces over which he has no control. Thus, he may
freely predict that he will be compelled to move his business to another
locality not because he personally opposes collective bargaining but
because collective bargaining endangers his institutional competitive
existence.12 9 But here the resemblance in approach ends, for the
Farmer Board has reversed the previous Board's presumption that
employer predictions were employer threats. It now holds that it will
resolve any doubts between predictions and threats in favor of employer
80
good faith.
In National Furniture Manufacturing Company,'81 the Board
found no economic threat in two employer pre-election letters warning
the employees that the company would be forced to move if it was forced
to meet union demands.
8 2 the employer threat
In Chicopee Manufacturing Corporation,'
"if the union [wins, we will] be forced to move the plant" was found
by the Board to be a "prediction of the possible impact of wage
demands upon the employer's business." In addition the Board stated
that, "a prophecy that unionization might ultimately lead to loss of
employment is not coercive where there is no threat that the Employer
will use its economic power to make its prophecy come true."' 8
Today, an employer may "predict" that voting for a union will
mean less overtime,8 4 less hours, 3 less work," 6 higher apprentice
standards, 8 ' mass layoffs,' s and a rash of strikes,'8 9 without giving
any reasons. He may prophesy that in event of a union victory, he
would be less zealous in acquiring new orders. 40 In "prophesying"
a relocation of the business he may cite a host of economic reasons
ranging from inability to meet competitive prices 141 to loss of necessary
42
customers. 1
In those instances where these types of "predictions" or "prophesies" prove ineffective or it is not feasible for the employer to relocate
129. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1959); Neco Electrical
Products Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 481 (1959); Edmont Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 525
(1958) ; Senorita Hosiery Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1956); Lanthier Machine
Works, 116 N.L.RB. 1029 (1956).
130. Senorita Hosiery Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1956).
131. 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
132. 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953).
133. Id.
134. Sunset Lumber Products, 113 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1955).
135. Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2067 (1954).
136. Avildson Tools & Machine, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1955).
137. Crosby Chemicals, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 412 (1958).
138. Carolina Mirror Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1712 (1959).
139. Edmont Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 525 (1958).
140. Walton Mfg. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1959).
141. Lanthier Machine Works, 116 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1956).
142. Neco Electrical Products Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 481 (1959).
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he may warn the employees that he will not bargain with the union,
even if it is elected, until forced to do so by the courts.14 3 The Board
here finds no coercion or frustration of the Act but only an "expression
of the employer's legal position," even though aware of the fact that
it might take years for judicial clarification of the company's legal
position.
This is a Board which stresses form over matter, which very
rarely interferes with the master of the proper phrase. In case after
case with the same background and the same values at stake, the
44
Board has reached incompatible results.1
This exaggerated legal parsing of employer speech, - this emphasis on denotation, not connotation, has, at times, led the Board to
the edges of comedy. In grim seriousness the Board held that a company president's remark to his employees "I am prohibited by law
from telling you that I will never sign a contract with the typographical union" was protected free speech under the umbrella of
Section 8(c).' 45
Professor Cox tells of an amusing incident in an unreported case
which occurred in one of the New England fishing ports. Prior to an
election in one of its processing plants, the company posted a notice
stating:
The management has diverted the S.S. Cape Ann to another plant in Boston because it cannot afford to bring additional
fish to this plant until the threat of labor unrest is removed."
The employees took the hint and voted against the union but the
election was set aside because the notice was threatening. Later
a new election was held. Two days before the election the employer posted a notice the gist of which was you may wonder
why a new election is being held so soon after the union was
soundly beaten in a prior election. The explanation is that the
first election was set aside by the NLRB because the company
posted the following notice of management policy just prior to
the election. Then followed the earlier notice. This time the
ruling was that management had done nothing more than explain the legal situation. 48
Section 8(c) explicitly prohibits the employer from economically
seducing his employees by appealing to their sense of avarice at the
143. Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1954).
144. Senorita Hosiery Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1956) ; Lanthier Mach.
Works, 116 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1956); Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955);
Sardis Luggage Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 446 (1955); Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
1045 (1954).
145. NLRB v. Sun Co., 215 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1954).
146. Cox, LAW AND THic NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 43 (Institute of Industrial
Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, 1960).
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time of unionization. However, here, as in the case of threats, the
Board has permitted the employer to take advantage of the economic
motivation test to frustrate employee rights. In the interest of higher
property and business values, the Board has permitted the employer to
invade the employees' right of association. The fact that the benefit or
the promise of benefit coincides with the union campaign, is now
regarded by the Board as irrelevant. The employer may describe,
before an election, his plan for improving wages and working conditions and defend his right to do so upon the rationale that the improvements are being made in "the normal course of business." He may
grant benefits to correct inequities caused by the increase in the cost
of living,'47 to conform to the law, 48 to assure the company's competitive position,'149 and to retain the company's skilled mechanics.' 50 In short
if an employer selects a proper business or economic motive, little
restraint is placed upon his right to promise or grant benefits.
Without bothering to discuss the point, the Board reversed the
presumption underlying the General Shoe doctrine, i.e. that employer
speech in election campaigns was not entitled to the same liberality it
enjoyed under Section 8(c). In reversing this doctrine the Board held
that it Would not void an election unless the speech was also an
infraction of Section 8(c),"5 ' and that in the future it would assume a
laissez-faire attitude toward elections, allowing the contestants a wide
latitude in the exchange of propaganda, insults and falsehoods.
The Board normally will not censor or police pre-election
propaganda by parties to elections, absent threats or acts of violence . . . Exaggerations, inaccuracies, partial truths, name-

calling, and falsehoods, while not condoned, may be exercised
as legitimate propaganda, provided they are not so misleading as
to prevent the exercise of a free choice5 2 by employees in the
election of their bargaining representative.
This opening of the election gates to virtually unlicensed speech
gave the employer a wide area in which to appeal to his employees'
ignorance. No longer could the union request the Board to void an
election because the employer interfered with the employees' free
choice through misrepresentation and falsehoods. It was now incumbent upon the union to neutralize the effect of misstatements by
147. NLRB v. Cleveland Trust Co., 214 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1954).
148. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1956).
149. Blackstone Mills, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 772 (1954).
150. Taylor-O'Brien Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 1 (1955).
151. National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953) ; Kent Plastic Corp.,
107 N.L.R.B. 157 (1953); American Laundry Machinery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 511
(1953).
152. Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093 (1955).
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replying to them,' 5 3 or, if that proved ineffective, by suing in libel and
slander.154
The Board has also condoned the employer practice of appealing to
the employees' prejudices by stirring up emotions of class hatred.
It treats appeals to racial prejudice under the category of persuasion,
protected by the absolute right of free speech, rather than under the
category of psychological coercion.
In Westinghouse Electric Corporation,155 the Board skirted the
issue on precedural grounds. In Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,'5 the employer accused the union of being pro-integration, of
contributing $75,000 to the N.A.A.C.P., and of submitting a prointegration brief to the Supreme Court. The Board found no violation
because the statements were correct. In Chock Full 0' Nuts Company,'57 the Board found that injection of the race issue by the employer was proper and that its discussion constituted no grounds for
invalidating the election. Employer predictions that the advent of
unionism brings equality - negro employees working side by side with
white employees and sharing the same rest rooms15 8 - do not constitute interference. The Board also failed to find a violation of the Act,
when an employer directed a colored employee to sit in the president's
chair as a prediction of things to come.' 5 9
The narrow application of the common law rules af agency by
the Board and the courts has permitted third parties to cooperate
with the employer in coercing employees to reject unionization He
may directly request his employees to dissuade fellow employees from
exercising their Section 7 rights, provided he does not threaten or
promise to benefit. 60 He may sit back passively, aware that his employees are passing out anti-union petitions and not be responsible
because he did not give specific directions for them to do so.' 6 ' He may
even make a coercive remark to his supervisor in the presence of an
62
employee, threatening to discharge anyone working for the union.
153. Unity Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 21 (1953).
154. Geyer Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 208 (1958); Houston Shell & Concrete
Div., McDonough Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1957); Wheelerweld Div., C. H. Wheeler
Mfg. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 698 (1957); Tuttle & Kilt, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 125 (1957);
Dallas City Packing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1956) ; Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 116
N.L.R.B. 196 (1956); Mason Can Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1956) ; Zeller Corp.,
115 N.L.R.B. 762 (1956); Dornback Furnace & Foundry Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 350
(1956) ; Otis Elevator Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1490 (1955) ; Harder's Inc., 114 N.L.R.B.
751 (1955).
155. 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957).
156. 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958).
157. 120 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1958).
158. American Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).
159. Model Mill Co., Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1953).

160. NLRB v. Reynold & Manley Lumber Co., 212 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1954).
161. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 998 (1955).
162. Pierce Industries, Inc., 46 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1960).
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The practice of funneling community strength and leveling it at
the unorganized is perhaps the most devastating single factor in defeating unionization.'
The Board has permitted private institutions
to cooperate with the employer in this practice. It is exceedingly
difficult to prove that the employer has directly requested these institutions to aid him. 164 He has no duty to disavow police assistance directed at the right of association, even if it occurs in his presence and
within his plant.' 65 He has no duty to disavow illegal conduct upon the
part of private groups within the community such as citizens committees 6° and local chambers of commerce. 67 At times he may even
cooperate with these institutions in opposing unionism.'6
He may
also bring pressure upon employees' families through letters and other
conduct.' 6 9
Another group within the community aiding the employer in his
battle against organization are the decision makers. The Board, under
a flexible "lack of substantial evidence" doctrine, very frequently reverses the trial examiners who reached their decisions at the scene of
conflict. 170 Many times these decisions on free choice must, of necessity,
be decisions of intuition rather than decisions of technicality, therefore it becomes an easy matter for the Board to substitute its version
of the facts for that of the trial examiner. The circuit courts also
employ this rule to protect the rights of employers, even though a step
further removed from the scene. The Fifth Circuit in a violent outburst against the trial examiner said:
The wholesale resolution by the examiner in favor of the board's
witnesses and the board's equally wholesale adoption of this resolution in a note to its opinion are as injudicious
as they are
7
unjudicial, as indefensible as they are surprising.1 '
It is not clear from the cases whether the Board in applying its
doctrines of "prophecies and predictions," "normal course of business,"
"statement of legal position" and "lack of substantial evidence" is
saying that indirect economic invasion of personality is permissible
because of a privileged absolute right of free speech or whether it is
163. KATZ, TAFT-HARTLEYISM IN SOUTHERN TEXTILS.
164. NLRB v. Plankinton Packing Co., 265 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1959).
165. Star Brite Industries, Inc., 46 L.R.R.M. 1139 (1960).
166. NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.
1955) ;Stratford Furniture Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1751 (1956).
167. Clarke Mills, 109 N.L.R.B. 666 (1954).
168. NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.

1955).
169. Funke, Board Regulation of Pre-Election Conduct, 36 TEXAs L. Rlv. 893,
900-1 (1958).
170. Midstate Hauling Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1960).
171. NLRB v. Cosco Products Co., 280 F.2d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 1960).
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denying that indirect economic invasion of personality is taking place
at all. According to the former theory, an invasion takes place but
it is justified by the pursuit of a higher value; according to the latter
theory, no invasion or unfair labor practice takes place because the
employer is under no duty to avoid indirect invasions of personality.
In the practical order of affairs, it makes little difference which theory
of justification the Board favors, for the result is the same. However
the Board's decisions and proclamations seem to indicate adoption of
the privileged rationale - the economic motivation test.
Recently, there has been a tendency upon the part of the Board to
expand this economic motivation theory. In Berg-Airlectric Products
Company,17 2 the Board held that an employer did not violate employee
rights under Section 7 when he called a meeting of his employees and
directed them to take a strike vote. The Board justified this extreme
action upon the basis that the employer's primary motive was not
interference with employee rights, but rather the understandable business motive of wanting to know if a strike was to take place in order
to make preparations for it.
There has also been a tendency to justify interferences with the
right of association not only in the name of economic and business
motivations, but any type of motivation as long as it is not explicitly
anti-union. This test shall be referred to as the "liberal motivation
7 the Board held that direct
test." In McFarlandv. Hullinger,"'
threats
by a superintendent, telling employees to stop "ganging up," that he
"would fire the one responsible if there was any more ganging up,"
were justified because the superintendent's motive for these remarks
was to protect his supervisory status, not to frustrate unionization.
Other cases of unfair labor practices have been dismissed when the
174
anger,'175 and joking. 176
company proved motivations of curiosity,
1
Another tool the Board employs to liberate an employer
from an
unfair labor practice is that of "excuse." In this type of case, one that
involves an intentional violation of the right of association, the Board
cannot make use of its economic motivation test. Instead, it makes use
of a liberal circumstance test in which it considers all the circumstances
surrounding the employer unfair practice and concludes that the employer act was too inconsequential to constitute a group threat.
It is ironic that the Board considers the employer's conduct in the
light of all the circumstances in order to free him from the stigma of
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

48 L.R.R.M. 1185 (1960).
48 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1961).
NLRB v. Falls City Creamery Co., 207 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1953).
Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 626 (1948).
Geo. Byers Sons, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 304 (1955).
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an unfair labor practice, while it refuses to consider the circumstance
of an employer non-coercive speech as shedding light upon his conduct.
In Morgantown Full FashionedHosiery Company,""the "isolated
instance doctrines," which the Board has employed frequently, was
utilized to excuse two supervisors who threatened two employees with
a plant shutdown if the union won the election. To Board Member
Murdock's observation that the warning would undoubtedly spread
throughout the plant, the Board said: ".

.

. [A]n employee mandate

cannot lightly be set aside merely because the normal and expected
plant discussion happens to include a few isolated threats by over
zealous minor supervisory personnel.'

178

The "understandable impulse" doctrine is used to excuse an employer who threatens his employees or the union in the course of bargaining. The Board assumes that threats to refuse to bargain or to
close the plant are motivated by employer anger, not employer malice.

179

In 1953 the newly-composed Board overruled the Bonwit-Teller
doctrine in the case of Livingston Shirt Corporation.s0 The employer,
enforcing a no-solicitation rule during working hours, gave several
non-coercive, anti-union speeches to his assembled workers during
working hours and refused to give the union the right to reply. The
Board, rejecting the rationale that Section 7 gave the employees the
right to hear both sides under approximately equal conditions, held
that, "in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule
(prohibiting union access to company premises on other than working
time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but not unlawful
because of the character of the business) an employer does not commit
an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection speech on company
time and premises to his employees and denies the unions request for an
opportunity to reply."

81

1

The decision was not unanimous, and the majority camp itself split
into factions over the very identification of the issue, one side viewing it
as a free speech problem, the other, as having nothing to do with free
speech. Chairman Farmer and member Rodgers voted for reversal
of Bonwit-Teller because they felt that employer free speech and
property rights were absolute rights, the exercise of which within the
plant did not materially interfere with union-employee communication,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

107 N.L.R.B. 1534 (1954).
Id. at 1538.
Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 626 (1948).
107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
Id.
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for the union still retained its time-honored and traditional means of
in-plant communication. They regarded the conditional rights theory of
the Bonwit-Teller doctrine as the "discredited Clark Brothers doctrine
in scant disguise."'' To them Section 8(c) granted a privilege of free
speech which "cannot be qualified by grafting upon it conditions which
are tantamount to negation."' 8 As to property rights they stated that
there is "nothing in the statute which even hints at any congressional
intent to restrict an employer in the use of his own premises for the
purpose of airing his views.""4' '

Member Murdock in dissent argued that the decision's practical
effect was to pervert the purpose of the Act by destroying equality .of
institutional speech.
8 5 the Board modified
In Peerless Plywood Company,1
its captive
audience rule in holding that although the employer possessed an
absolute right of free speech, the Board could in its control over election
campaigns, restrict this right. It accordingly held that any speech to a
captive audience during the twenty-four hour period immediately preceding an election was a per se interference which voided the election.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals carried the absolute free
speech rationale of the Livingston Shirt decision to its logical conclusion, by holding, on facts identical to those in Bonwit-Teller, that an
employer had an absolute right to speak even though he violated his
privileged no-solicitation rule and at the same time refused to grant the
union the right to reply.' 8 It appears, however, that the Board is not
87
willing to go so far as to void the narrow Bonwit-Teller rule.
With the disposal of the captive audience doctrine, the Board
turned its attention to the captive individual doctrine, i.e. interrogation of employees. Throughout its history, the Board had held that
employer interest in eliciting union information was of insufficient imp6rtance to merit interference with the right of association. Professor
Cox, discussing this problem, said:
Prior to 1947 and in some degree from 1947 to 1953, the Board's
premise was that the employer, though he might be opposed to
unions, had no legally cognizable interest in preventing the
unionization of his plant. Since many specific issues arising in
the administration of the Act turn upon the balance of conflicting
interests, assigning a zero value to the employer's interest in
breaking up an incipient union would frequently tip the scale in
182. Id. at 407.
183. Id. at 406.

184. Id. at 406.
185. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
186. NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
187. Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1955 (1954).
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the union's favor. A case in point is the former rule that interrogation of employees concerning union activities is an unfair labor
practice per se, for although the degree of coercion may be very
slight, the employer rarely has enough legitimate interest in the information to justify even the slight interference with freedom to
organize. 8 8
Throughout the early Taft-Hartley days, the Board consistently
applied the Standard-Coosa-Thatcherdoctrine,"8 9 which condemned all
systematic interrogation of employees as per se unfair labor practices.
This doctrine rejected as irrelevant such defenses as employer motivation, although it excused extremely isolated and casual cases of interrogation.
In the Blue Flash Express case' 90 an employer systematically
interrogated his employees individually in his office in order to determine whether the union had a majority status. The Board promptly
overruled the Standard-Coosa-Thatcherdoctrine, and applied its objective economic motivation test, completely ignoring the subjective
reaction of fear from the employees. Although the Board's rationale
was based upon the hypothesis that doctrinaire rules should not apply
in the sensitive conflicts of labor relations, - "the test is whether
under all the circumstances, the interrogation tends to restrain or
interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act,"'' - it is obvious that such a vague litmus test as this serves no
value except as a device by which the Board can justify its own predispositions and values. In this case, for instance, although it was
evident from the record that the employees had lied about their union
affiliations because of fear of reprisal from the employer, the Board
obviously thought such fears were unreasonable. "The only reasonable
inference from the Blue Flash Express case, despite insistence to the
contrary in the majority opinion, is that the employer may safely
question his employees about their union affiliations and activities so
long as he is just a little careful about not coupling his interrogation
with specific threats or promises tied in with the employees' future
union activities.'

92

One of the major problems presently confronting the Board is
the formulation of a doctrine to prevent the widespread employer
practice of visiting employees and their families at their homes, and of
188. Cox op cit. supra note 146, at 40.
189. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
190. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).

191. Id. at 593.
192. Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer

Persuasion,"49 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 594, 599 (1954).
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calling individual employees into company offices in order to persuade
them to reject unionization. 93 Unfortunately, however, the Board
appears to have lost all feeling and vision for the Act's policy, while
becoming hopelessly entangled in a maze of legalities and technicalities. In attempting to follow the Board in making distinctions
between office interrogation for research purposes 1 4 and for disclosure
purposes,' 95 between work-bench interrogation 9 ' and conference room
interrogation 9 the mind reels.
The Board had always assumed that the employees had an institutional relational interest to information which permitted the union
to enter the employer's premises during non-working hours to solicit
and to distribute literature. Although it was true that the Board imposed harsher rules on distribution than it imposed on solicitation, it
allowed the union to distribute its literature when it could show that
off-plant distribution was difficult. 9 No distinction was drawn between employee and non-employee distribution, for this "would be a
differentiation not only without substance but in clear defiance of the
rationale given by the Board and the courts for permitting solicitation."199
In 1954 a rash of identical cases appeared before the Board, all
similar to the Republic-LeTourneau case except that the distributors of
200
literature were non-employee union organizers rather than employees.
These cases were decided in NLRB v. Babcock-Wilcox. 20 ' In the
Babcock-Wilcox Company the Board held that the employer committed an unfair labor practice in refusing to permit non-employees to
distribute literature in his parking lot when it was difficult for the
union to distribute it off company property. The United States
Supreme Court overruled the Board on the basis of status, distinguishing its decisions in Republic-LeTourneau on the ground that
only "employees" were there involved, while here "non-employees"
193. Funke, Board Regulation of Pre-Election Conduct, 36

TZXAs

L. Rzv. 893,

900-1, (1958).
194. Blue Flash Express Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
195. Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1959). See also NLRB
v. Roberts Bros., 225 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Protein Blenders, Inc.,
215 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1954).
196. Mall Tool Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1955); See also Shick, Inc., 118
N.L.R.B. 1160 (1957); The Bryant Elec. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
197. People's Drug Store, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 634 (1957).
198. Caldwell Furniture Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1952); Carolina Mills, 92
N.L.R.B. 1141 (1950).
199. Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954).
200. Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d

858 (10th Cir. 1955); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954), enforcement granted,
222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954),
enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955).

201. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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were involved. This distinction, said the court, was "one of sub20 2

stance."
The judicial philosophy regarding the problem of employee access
to union information appears to be that the union does not possess an
independent right of its own to provide information. The right stems
from the employees' right of association and therefore, is derivative,
not direct. The court recognizes, however, the existence of this institutional relational interest, and regards it as unconditional outside the
premises and conditional within the premises.
If the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts
to communicate with them, the employer must allow the union
to approach his employees on his property. . . . When the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempt by non-employees to communicate with them through the
usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication
of information on the right to organize. 0 8
The result of this decision, favoring property rights and control
over union access, is that the courts and the Board now entertain a
strong presumption that the lines of industrial communication between
the union and the employees are open outside the plant. It is necessary
in order to rebut this presumption that the union and the Board
convince the courts within the records, that a contrary situation exists.
The court now passes on the facts, not the Board.
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers (the Nutone and Avondale Mill
cases) ,204 the Supreme Court extended this absolute right of property
concept by holding that employer plant rules are not limited by their
originating reasons, such as efficiency and cleanliness, but only by
the concept of private property itself. An employer, it was held, may
breach his own rules by engaging in activity which he forbids to his
employees.
In Nutone, the Court held that an employer did not commit an
unfair labor practice when, during a pre-election campaign, he violated
his own no-distribution rule which was allegedly based on plant cleanliness. In Avondale it was held that although the employer breached
his no-solicitation rule by unfair labor practices the employees were
not privileged to breach the rule.
It is evident from these Supreme Court cases that a radical
change has taken place in the minds of the decision makers with re202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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spect to property rights and the right of association. During its
earlier days, the Board had applied an industrial clear and present
danger test in favor of the employee to any no-solicitation legislation
emanating from the plant police powers. Plant legislation prohibiting
solicitation even during working hours had to be justified in the name
of higher industrial values such as production and efficiency. Today,
however, under a new industrial "reasonable" test, there exists an
irrebutable presumption in favor of plant police powers. In the recent
Star Brite case,205 the Board held that a no-solicitation rule covering
working time was valid despite the fact that the employer initiated the
rule during a union campaign, restricted it to union organizations, and
made no showing that the rule was necessary to maintain plant
production and efficiency. In Midwestern Instruments, Incorporated,°6
the Board affirmed this decision, even though the employer had conceded that the main purpose of the rule was not related to production.
In the Board's recent Star Brite decision, the Board held that
a rule which prohibits union activity during company time is
not rendered invalid merely because its adoption coincides with
the advent of the union, or because it fails to prohibit other types
of outside activity. We also noted in that decision that to require an employer to establish that such rules are necessary for
production and discipline would render the presumption of validity
worthless ....
In a recent Fifth Circuit case,2"" the court narrowed the rationale of
the Babcock-Wilcox case by reversing a Board ruling that the employer,
a retail chain store manager, violated Section 8 (a) (1) when he
prevented solicitation during non-working time in non-public working
areas by employees from other area stores belonging to the same chain
and included in the same bargaining unit. The court gave as its reason
the employer's difficulty in separating employees from the public.
VI.
NEW

INDUSTRIAL

SOCIETY REPLACES

OLD MERCANTILE SOCIETY.

If it is true, as it is often said, that history writes in crooked
lines, then it is equally true that the National Labor Relations Board
writes in circular lines. It has spoken in two voices, one favoring
administrative restraint, the other favoring administrative activism.
205. 46 L.R.R.M. 1139 (1960).
206. 48 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1961).
'M7 MT 1?R w Grmt A & P Tea Co.. 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960).
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This division of administrative approach concerning the basic tenets of
the Act has taken place despite the fact that the policy of the Act has
neither been changed nor amended since its inception. It is not the
purpose of this article to praise the pre-1953 Board for having been
pro-labor, nor to condemn the post-1953 Board for having been promanagement but rather to criticize the Board for not having been
pro-statute.
The National Labor Relations Act was more than a private
standard between labor and management, more than a code defining
the permissible limits of economic warfare between these institutions
in their pursuit for greater control over the market and the individual.
It was an official pronouncement upon the part of the nation that both
institutional and personal freedom could co-exist within the boundaries
of the new industrial society. Upon the success of this experiment
involving profound institutional changes within the national structure,
depended to a great extent the preservation of the democratic ethos in
a world torn by conflicting ideologies.
The National Labor Relations Act was an institutional act based
upon institutional rights; it rejected the economic and political assumptions of the mercantile society which stressed the predominance of
individualistic institutions and individualistic rights. It recognized that
the 18th and 19th centuries' symbol of success '-- the economic man

-

no longer fitted into the social pattern of the 20th century, that he was
now superseded by the sociological man.
The citizen who lived in the pre-industrial society of the 18th and
19th centuries lived in an acquisitive society. His religious, philosophical, and social life were all subordinated to his economic life
i.e. the pursuit of economic status. His political, social, and legal institutions were all acquisitively centered upon the same goal, the
exploitation, production and distribution of the nation's resources.
It was a society whose institutions were carefully designed for boom
conditions.208
The political and theological temper of this mercantile society was
shaped by the protestant ethic which emphasized the function of the
individual rather than the function of the institution, the quest for the
wealth value rather than the quest for the respect value, and the commercial virtues of thrift, work and independence rather than the
theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. The social structure containing this economic theology was encased in the agricultural units
of the farm, the town, the village and the store, all channeled toward
208. Wzan, THE GREAT FRONTIER 413 (1952).
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the centuries' greatest social institution - the market. And standing
detached, yet concerned, protecting this economic order stood the
political community -

the state -

with its arsenal of acquisitive

weapons, the legal tools of freedom of speech, contract, and property.
Yet, notwithstanding this sweeping subordination of all social
life to economic life, but rather because of it, this pre-industrial
society was an integrated society in which the individual had both
status and function.2"' In order for the individual to belong, he had to
achieve status which was contingent upon the acquisition and control of
property and since this society was an open society it was a relatively
simple matter for a man to be a property owner and exercise property
rights.
The economic reaping machine of the mercantile society functioned well in a period of growth. When, however, the American
frontier could no longer provide the fuel for its outward growth and
the open society was transformed into the closed society, the economic
machine had to turn inward and feed upon the power centers of the
American economy. At that stage it began to lose its sense of integrated
rhythm. In 1929 the inevitable occurred - the economic man fell
from his pedestal and with him fell the old order.
Almost overnight the American people, accustomed to a commercial society directed by commercial institutions, found themselves confronted by industrial problems arising from industrial institutions.
The large corporation replaced the farm and the trading town; countervailing power and administered prices replaced the market and competition; and draftsmanship and mass production replaced craftsmanship and personal production. The individual no longer walked among
the small mercantile institutions but now found himself within a pressure chamber, surrounded by big cities, big business, big labor unions
and big government. The introduction of these new industrial institutions had a sweeping impact upon the social structure of the American
economy. The new society when it changed its status symbol, replacing
the aristocratic farmer who exercised his power as a result of his
property rights, with the entrepreneur who exercised his power without
property rights,2 10 destroyed with one sweep the value structure of
economic status of the old society. Unfortunately, however, having
destroyed the individual's status and function in the old order, it
prepared no place for him in the new society. By failing to integrate
209. DRUCKER, THE FUTURE OP INDUSTRIAL MAN 54 (1942).

210. Id. at 93. See also BzRLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY; A NEw DEvLoiP(1959).

MXNT IN AMERICAN POLrrICAL ECONOMY
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him into the new industrial reality, it disenfranchised him and made
21 1
him a displaced person within his own community.
The dispossessed worker of the 20th century discovered that he
could not function as an isolated individual in a hostile world of
institutions. Persecuted by the corporation, ignored by the state, he
gradually realized that freedom of contract in the 18th century meant
freedom of coercion in the 20th century. He thereupon rejected the
individualistic legal tools of freedom of speech, contract and property
and created a new social institution to provide him with a power film
of status necessary to counteract the new institutional power status.
In unionizing, he surrendered his legal liberties to private industrial
governments who now contracted status and respect for him. In so
doing, 20th century man reversed Maine's famous dictum that progressive societies moved from status to contract. 2 The movement which
characterizes social and legal thinking in the 20th century is the
movement from contract to status, and the 20th century medium which
encases status is the institution - the group.
VII.
THE GROUP SUPERSEDES THE STATE, SOCIETY,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

The complex governmental decision making process can no longer
be adequately described in simple Austinian terms as a conflict between
two participants, the individual and the state, within the political community. Today, both the individual and the state have been superseded
by the group. Within the political order and the social order respectively, state sovereignty and individual sovereignty have given way to
group sovereignty. =1 8
In this new power pluralistic society the state is but one of many
groups which determines the national and international policy. Within
the governmental process many unofficial pressure groups through
action and interaction, compromise and alliance, exert tremendous
pressure upon the state decision makers at Washington. Many critics
have pointed out that this multi-group pressure endangers the democratic structure of government because it forces the state to place
211. DRUCKER, op cit. supra note 209, at 107.
212. MAINE, ANCIXNT LAW 100 (Everyman ed. 1861).
213. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION (1953);

Soclmry (1950) ; FRIDMAN, LAW
CAN CAPITALISM (1952); HORN,

DRUCKZR, THE

Ngw

IN A CHANGING SocIETY (1959); GALBRITH, AMERIGROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); LATHAM,

THE GROUP BASIS OP POLITICS (1952); SAIDI
WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN
o(O
13 LA- I_ "Rv. ,A

BERG, PosT-HiSTORIC MAN (1950);
(1956); Wirtz, Government by Private Groups.
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limited group interests before expansive national interests.2 14 -Others
feel that a new type of industrial sovereignty is already upon us.
.. . the question must be raised in all seriousness whether the
'overmighty subjects' of our time - the giant corporations, both
of a commercial and non-commercial character, the labor unions,
the trade associations, farmers organizations, veterans legions,
and some other highly organized groups - have taken over the
substance of sovereignty. Has the balance of pressures and counter-pressures between these groups left the legal power of the
State as a mere shell? If this is a correct interpretation of the
social change of our time, we are witnessing another dialectic
process in history: the national sovereign State - having taken
over effective legal and political power from the social groups of
the previous age - surrenders its power to the new massive
social groups of the industrial age.215
The three most powerful institutions of our feudal industrial
society are the state, the corporation, and the labor union. Two of
these groups, the labor union and the corporation, comprise the new
factory community. This community is the predominant social,
political, and economic institution of the 20th century, much more
powerful than the state, and much more exacting and demanding in
its laws flowing from the collective bargaining process than the statemade laws flowing from the political process. Already within the
political order the factory community has fundamentally altered the
power structure of government by substituting economic federalism
for political federalism.21 6 Most of the crucial conflicts of freedom today
arise not from state-national clashes of power but from clashes among
the three principal participants in the feudal industrial order. At times
the factory community acts in unison against the state; at other times,
the participants clash between themselves, the corporation seeking the
wealth value, the union seeking the respect value. In attempting to
emerge victorious within this power conflict, both institutions exercise
maximum effort to rally the state to their side.
The 20th century has witnessed the rise of mass democracies
throughout the world. The impact of this movement has not only
resulted in severe changes in the state's power structure, but also in its
power function. Group demands arising from society have been directed toward the greater distribution of values among the masses.
214. LIPPMAN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955).
215. Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups and the Law,

57 COLUm. L. Rev. 155, 165 (1957).

216. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security States," 10 STAN. L. Rxv.
620, 636 (1958) ;Berle, Evolving Capitalism and Political Federalism, in FzD.RALISM;
MATURU AND EM-RG NT 68, 76 (Macmahon ed. 1955).
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The modern western state has abandoned its negative role of a watchman and has taken on the affirmative role of an architect. It is no longer
an umpire state concerned only with the wealth value; it is now a
welfare state concerned with the respect value.
Aside from group control over the modern state and its social
values, the third great change arising from modern society is group control over the individual. The fundamental unit of society is no longer the
individual, but the group. The economic man has given way to the
organization man. "The completely autonomous isolated individual
does not exist as such - the individual spends his life as a member
of groups and is significant only as a member of a group. '

217

"It is

the organization rather than the individual which is productive in an
industrial system,

218

'
for "this is an age of collective action.

219

A new institutional philosophy stressing group rights and group
duties instead of individual rights and individual duties has taken hold
of the industrial society. The protestant ethic has been replaced by the
social ethic, ".

.

. that contemporary body of thought which makes

morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual. Its
major propositions are three: a belief in the group as the source of
creativity; a belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the
individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve the
belongingness." 220
Although America in this second half of the 20th century is a
highly industrialized society, it is still predominantly pre-industrial in
temperament and outlook.2 21 It has never accepted the industrial way
of life. It still continues to delude itself that DesMoines, Carson City
and Iowa City represents the real America and Detroit, Chicago, and
New York the unreal America. It still continues to believe that 18th
century political and legal institutions framed for an agricultural
economy can contain 20th century institutions framed for a social
dynamic order. The battle for freedom, is still being fought on an
18th century platform instead of in a 20th century arena.
While it may appear to the uninitiated that we are winning the
battle of freedom on the political front because the Supreme Court is
protecting the person from state-institutional invasions of his personality, it also appears to the more sophisticated that we are losing
the battle for freedom on the economic front, and that the Supreme
217. Miller, supra note 216, at 631.
218. DRUCKER, THE NEw SocieT 6 (1950).
219. COMMONS, THE EcoNoMIcs Or COLLECTIVE

AcTioN 23
220. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 5 (1956).

(1950).

221. DRUCKER, op. cit. supra note 209, at 22.
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Court is not protecting the person from economic invasions of his
personality by private institutions. 22 To separate economic freedom
from political freedom, to affirm freedom within the political order and
to deny it in the economic order, is not only to delude ourselves but
to defame the name of freedom. The industrial order has succeeded in
performing this act of surgery. Modern industrial man, especially the
unemployed and the disorganized, has been disenfranchised not by the
state but by our technological society. The industrial enterprise by
denying the worker citizenship within the industrial democracy of the
factory community has also denied him citizenship in the political
democracy of the national community. The average worker with little
or no stake in his industrial society will have little or no interest in his
political society. The unemployed and unorganized worker becomes
the displaced and disorganized citizen.
The principal task of our times is the creation of an industrial
civilization, an industrial structure in which personal freedom and
institutional freedom can co-exist. The problems incident to this task
can only be solved by restoring to the person, i.e. the worker, his
status and function and by integrating the industrial reality, both its
social and industrial institutions, into the political process for the common good of all. The problem of freedom must always begin and end
with the primacy of the person in the hierarchy of values. It cannot be
solved by the employment of antique legal tools framed for a different
order. We have progressed from a society based upon contract and
wealth values to a society based upon status and respect values. The
problems arising from this new society are trilateral, not bilateral.
New legal tools must be fashioned which can cope with problems
arising from a group society. Since the government of the new
society consists of a new ruling class of groups, the law must consider
the status and relationship of the person to these institutions. For
example, a union member not only has rights and duties toward his
union, but he has also rights and duties toward other institutions, such
as the local community, the state, the church and his family. At times
these rights and duties conflict. To allow an institution, for instance a
labor union, through freedom of contract to expel a member because
he voted against a union proposal or violated a minor union rule is to
permit an economic institution to strike at the essence of a free society.
Here, not only the personal freedom of the individual is at stake but
also the relational interests of the other institutions. The law of
222. Affeldt, The Labor Bill of Rights 37 U. DgT. L.J. 500 (1960).
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institutional relational interests is yet to be developed but Dean Greene
has made a good beginning in this area."z
The decision makers in the legal process must recognize that the
right of association is not only a fundamental personal right, but a
fundamental relational interest. They must recognize that it flows
from a new economic institutional constitution contained in Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act. These economic group rights
must be balanced against the political rights contained in the United
States Constitution, not simply struck down in the name of absolute
constitutional rights.
In order for personal freedom and institutional freedom to coexist within the industrial order, the legal process must not make the
fatal error of equating the person and the institution as equal recipients
of constitutional liberties. For example the exercise of free speech by
the person usually ends in enlightenment, but the exercise of free
speech by the institution usually ends in coercion. There is a vast
difference between institutional liberty and personal liberty, and the
legal process must take account of this fact.
The Wagner Act was an attempt by the American people to solve
the problem of freedom by balancing personal freedom and institutional
freedom so as to allow both to co-exist within an industrial society.
The government protected personal freedom by guaranteeing in Section
9 (a) employee self-determination and reinforced this guarantee in
Sections 7 and 8 (a) (1), by explicitly condemning employer interference with the personal right of association and collective bargaining.
In this area of employee personal freedom, involving the right to
accept or reject unionization, the government was not neutral. It directly intervened in the industrial order and threw its weight and
authority behind employee free choice, protecting the employee not
only from employer invasion but also from state invasion. The government protected institutional freedom by withdrawing from the economic
arena after the employees had either rejected or accepted unionization,
assuming a neutral attitude toward the process of collective bargaining
and the economic warfare of concerted activities.
The result during the Wagner days and in a modified form during
the early Taft-Hartley days was that the National Labor Relations
Board implemented national policy by protecting the employee from
employer invasions. It recognized the right of the union to share the
employer's premises and the plant forum in order that the employees
could enjoy their institutional right to information concerning union
223. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rzv. 460 (1935).
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activities. To insure that enlightenment, not coercion prevailed within
the plant community, it carefully screened employer speech.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act confirmed employer free speech,
subtracted some benefits of unionization, such as the closed shop,
and clarified the right of employees to reject unionization, it in no way
amended the basic policy of the Wagner Act. It did not disturb the
hierarchy of values contained in Section 7 which committed the.
government to a policy of intervention to protect employee selfdetermination. "The wisdom of legal protection for the core of rights
[was] not open to serious public dispute."224 In fact Congress explicitly confirmed its faith in personal freedom by declaring it to be
the policy of the United States to "eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions ...by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association." 2 5
In re-interpreting the Act, the Farmer Board, without congressional amendment nor any hint of change in national thinking,
completely revamped the policy of the Act by substituting mercantile
values for industrial values. In turning back the clock, the Board
completely reshuffled Section 7's hierarchy of values, placing at the
apex, in the place of the right of association, the new employer right the right of disassociation. In effectuating this policy it permitted the
employer to invade employees' rights on all fronts, allowing him to
coerce his employees and to isolate them from the union and his
plant.
The question naturally arises - how was it possible for a small
body of men in public view to amend national policy by substituting
its will for the popular will? The answer to this question cannot help
but focus doubt upon the ability of political institutions such as the
NLRB to adequately contain the social institutions of the industrial
order.
It is the thesis of this article that the post-1953 Board under the
spell of an appealing but false theory of legal equality drove both the
state and the union - the two institutions protecting the employee from the industrial arena. It permitted the remaining participant,
enterprise, to form a new alliance with the state, designed toward the
suppression of the worker in his organizational activities. By substituting institutional freedom for personal freedom, by employing a
mercantile interpretation of statutory and constitutional doctrines, and
224. Cox, LAW AND THP NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 39 (1960).
225. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 61 Stat. 136,
137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
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by affirming its faith in a democracy of non-existent individuals rather
than in a realistic democracy of groups, the National Labor Relations
Board proclaimed to a world community that personal and institutional
freedom could not co-exist within American industrial society.
In structure the Board is not designed to reflect the views of the
group community. It is not a coalition board composed of representatives from industry, labor and the public; it is a political Board
composed of political appointees. As a political institution it is inclined
to reflect the views of the administration in power rather than the
views of society at large; to be pro-institution rather than pro-statute.
In 1953 the new administration appointed a new majority to the
Board, Chairman Farmer and Members Rodgers and Beeson. Almost
immediately this new Board denounced the previous Boards for having
been mechanistic and biased, and announced that its policy would be
flexible and neutral. "As custodian of the law, the proper role of the
agency is to apply it as the creators of the law intended it to be applied
'
without regard to personal preferences." 226
The new Board professed
a philosophy that was neither pro-labor nor pro-employer, but rather
227
pro-public.
This new doctrinal approach of neutrality was based on the
silent Board assumption that since both labor and management were
now equally powerful, they should be equally free from government
intervention in waging economic warfare for the control of the unorganized worker. This new indifference toward employee freedom
marked a radical departure from Board policy which was established at
the inception of the Act in 1935. Previously, the Board had viewed
the policy of the Act as two-edged, protecting both personal and institutional freedom. It regarded Section 7 as an aristocratic and
democratic Bill of Rights: aristocratic in that it discriminated in favor
of the unorganized employee in his conflict with the organized institution; democratic in that it did not discriminate in favor of any groups
in their institutional conflicts among themselves.
The Board prior to 1953 was unified in believing that Congress
intended to extend greater protection in the form of state support to
the natural person than to the conventional institution and that it did
not intend to make them equal in the legal order because they were
not equal in the social order. It believed that Congress wrote into the
Act the spirit of our democratic heritage - that in order for the
226. Address by
York, N.Y., Jan. 12,
227. Remarks of
mittee of the Edison

Member Rogers before Retail Dry Goods Association, New
1954, reprinted in part, 33 LAB. RML. Rep. 207-9.
Chairman Farmer before Joint Conference of Industrial ComElectric Institute, New Orleans, La., Jan. 21, 1954.
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person to be free within the industrial order, it was necessary that the
institution not be completely free within the legal order.
The Farmer Board of 1953 with its neutrality or equality doctrine
reversed the previous policy of applying different standards of protection to the hierarchy of rights contained in Section 7. By so doing,
it democratized Section 7, reducing personal freedom to the status of
institutional freedom, thereby applying its neutrality theory to all of
Section 7's values equally.
The Board's function in the administration of the Act was
not to be neutral. Neither was its function to be pro-labor or promanagement. Its function was to be pro-collective bargaining and
pro-individual. In a society dominated by the giants of the factory
community, its function was to protect the worker's personal freedom,
his right to accept or reject industrial democracy within an environment free from the economic pressures and disconcerting influences of enterprise. Government was allied with neither institution;
it was committed to the protection of the individual, the unorganized
employee. It was not neutral; it was a prejudiced, active participant.
This administrative agency had no right to democratize the legal
rights contained in Section 7 because Congress had already evaluated
these rights and had found that employee right of association outweighed employer economic interference.
For the Board to have withdrawn the protection of the Act from
the unorganized was a mistake in the administrative order, but for it
to have withdrawn this protection in the name of equality and neutrality was a mistake in a higher order. Equality is a warm word
which has the seductive ring of freedom, 'conjuring up the cause for
which our forefathers died. Unfortunately, however, the Board in
applying this concept to the National Labor Relations Act was speakinig about legal equality, not social equality with which the Act was
concerned. It is a harsh fact of life that legal equality does not always
insure social equality. In fact, many times they are opposed to each
other.
To speak of neutrality and equality within the legal order and to
ignore the differences in bargaining power between the participants in
the industrial order is not to speak of neutrality but to speak of
partisanship. In the interpretation of a broad social statute like the
National Labor Relations Act, it is impossible for an agency to adopt
an attitude of neutrality without fundamentally changing the policy of
the Act and taking a biased position in favor of the stronger participant in the economic order, for "the equal treatment of unequals
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produces only inequality. '221 Once the state was banished from the
economic arena, the Board by ignoring economic inequality and employing the tools of legal equality, restored the industrial order to the
economic power concept of the mercantile society. It "seems a fair
conclusion that the law has become in this area a matter primarily
of form and that economic power has re-emerged as the decisive
229
factor in determining the result of representative elections.
"The net [effect] of the present law of employer persuasion is
that the employer may do in some form, the persuasional equivalent of
everything he is prohibited from doing in another form - except only
that he may not penalize individual employees for their views and
may not establish his own union . . . . It is hard to conceive of any
statement regarding an employer's future plans which could not be
presented in the form of 'prediction', 'prophecy' or 'statement of legal
rights'. The doctrine of 'isolated instance' has been used to immunize a
wide variety of statements and activities, and the 'good faith' umbrella
now extends over a broad area of bargaining procrastination, lethargy
280
and even intransigeance.
The post-1953 Board's policy of equality ran in two directions.
By equalizing the person and the institution from within the confines
of the Act, through statutory interpretation, it drove the state from
the plant community. By equalizing the person and the institution
from without the confines of the Act, through constitutional interpretation, it drove the union from the factory community. Specifically,
through "free speech", the Board banished the union from the plant
forum; through "property", it banished the union from the plant.
The common law, individualistic in nature, has always displayed
more ingenuity in adapting itself to the revolutionary changes of individualistic units than it has to institutional units. In attempting to
assimilate new institutions into its fabric, it has always displayed
extreme perplexity and confusion. The status of the corporation was
eventually resolved by absorbing it as an individual. The status of the
labor union, although originally regarded as a criminal conspiracy,
was resolved by assigning it the status of a person under a civil
rights theory." 1 The result today, in this second half of the 20th
century, is that great industrial empires enjoy the same constitutional
rights as the isolated individual. In many cases, these constitutional
rights which emerge from the United States Constitution as personal
228.
229.
230.
231.

Wirtz, supra note 192, at 614.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 608-9.
See GRmORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 82 (1958).
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rights radiate from the institution as coercive rights. This unrealistic
process of equating the person and the institution as co-equal beneficiaries of constitutional rights has caused much embarrassment for
the Supreme Court. In Thornhill v. Alabama2 2 the Court equated
group speech with personal speech, and was compelled to retreat from
this position when it realized that the union was practicing the persuasion of force rather than the persuasion of speech. In the Virginia
Electric & Power Company233 case, where the Court made the same
mistake, it ignited a conflagration of contradictory doctrines which
still continue to haunt labor relations.
It should be obvious to all but the most prejudiced that institutional speech in most instances is not a matter of free speech, but a
matter of power. The "issue actually presented is whether the employer should be permitted to add the weight of his economic power
to what he says in pre-election campaign speeches. This presents
neither more nor less a 'free speech' issue than does employee picketing . .

.

. It only camouflages and confuses the real problem when

there is proposed or developed, in the name of 'free speech', a privilege
of using speech as part of the persuasion not of reason but of pres23 4
sure."
To insist that it is a free speech problem as the courts and the
Board have done, is to legislate within the power arena by expanding
and contracting the allowable area of economic conflict. Under our
political system the drawing of economic frontiers is the exclusive
concern of the legislature. It is the most gross form of activism for
administrative and judicial agencies to enter into this area under the
guise of constitutional doctrine.
Individual speech tends toward knowledge and enlightenment;
it is of the drawing room. Economic institutional speech tends toward
power and force; it is of the battlefield. To equate the two in time of
conflict is to make a policy decision in favor of institutional force. A
representative of a group or institution speaks in two capacities;
as a citizen and as a commander. In the former status, by virtue of his
personal constitutional rights, he is permitted broad latitude in expressing his views to the public. In his latter status, by virtue of his
position as a military leader, he should not be permitted the same
latitude in speaking to his subordinates because here he is conveying
orders for economic advancement in an economic war. This is not
persuasion but a verbalization of orders, a verbal act.
232. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

233. N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
234. Wirtz, supra note 192, at 613.
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Congress has always recognized that speech between institutions
concerning market agreements is not free speech but an illegal act
indictable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Supreme Court,
at least in the past, has recognized that institutional speech differs
immeasurably from personal speech. In Gompers v. Buck Stove &
Range Company," 5 it held that a labor leader, who stated in his
opinion that no union member should purchase products from certain
named firms who refused to hire union help, was guilty of conspiracy.
Society itself is an organization, and does not object to organizations for social, religious, business and all legal purposes. The
law, therefore, recognizes the right of working men to unite and
to invite others to join their ranks, thereby making available
the strength, influence, and power that come from association.
By virtue of this right, powerful labor unions have been organized.
But the very fact that it is lawful to form these bodies, with
multitudes of members means that they have thereby acquired a
vast power, in the presence of which the individual may be
helpless. This power when unlawfully used against one, cannot
be met, except by purchasing peace at the cost of submitting to
terms which involve the sacrifice of rights protected by the Constitution; or by standing on such rights, and appealing to the
preventive powers of a court of equity. When such appeal is
made, it is the duty of government to protect the one against the
many as well as the many against the one.
In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in
concert when the signal is published gives the words 'unfair,'
'we don't patronize', or similar expressions, a force not inhering
in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible
right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such
circumstances they become what have been called 'verbal acts'
and as much subject to injunction as the' 23use
of any other force
6
whereby property is unlawfully damaged.

In the name of another constitutional right, the absolute control of
property, the Supreme Court in the Babcock-Wilcox decision 23 7 paved
the way for state alliance with enterprise by excommunicating the
union from the plant community. This decision in effect destroyed the
relational interest of the employees to receive information from the
union within the plant. It substituted the employer as the guardian of
the employees' rights and relational interests.
The policy of encouraging collective bargaining is not unqualified,
for Section 7 reserves to the individual employee the right to
235. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
236. Id. at 439.
237. NLRB v. Babcock-Wilcox Co..151 TI

inf (io1o;
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refrain from concerted activities, and Section 9 gives to the
majority in the bargaining unit the power to reject the process of
collective bargaining. These, however, are rights granted to the
individual employees, not to the employer. To read into these
provisions the right of the employer to resist and obstruct
unionization is to conceive of the employer as the benevolent
protector of his employees,
a direct denial of the underlying
28
premises of the statute.
As a result of this decision no longer do the Board and courts
balance individualistic property rights against institutional group
rights, but now strike them down in the name of absolute constitutional
rights. Such action, in view of the fact that Congress, in Section 7,
had privileged incidental intrusions upon property control, once again
is a violation of the legislative domain by the decision makers.
VIII.
CONCLUSION.

It should be obvious from this survey of the right of association
that personal freedom in our technological society is not being protected by either the National Labor Relations Board or the courts.
The decision makers within the political process are failing to meet
the crucial problems of freedom emanating from the new industrial
process. They still continue to apply legal tools with built in values
framed for a mercantile society, in direct defiance of legislative policy.
As a result of this approach, they have accomplished what the 1947
Congress and industry together could not accomplish - the freezing of
labor's drive to organize the unorganized. 8 9
238. Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSp LAw Rzv.
93, 103 (1955).
! 239. Cox, op. cit. supra note 224, at 20. Professor Cox says: "The struggle
for union organization has not been completed. Despite the power of some unions
there remain masses of unorganized workers who would benefit by collective bargaining. In the United States about half the employees engaged in manufacturing
belong to labor organizations; in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, more than 90
per cent. In the United States roughly 15.8 million workers out of the 64.8 million
employed belong to unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations - about 25 per cent. In Great Britian 42
per cent of the employed persons are union members.
"Collective bargaining is no longer spreading. In 1933, 11.5 per cent of the
employees in nonagricultural establishments belonged to a labor union; in 1940,
27.2 per cent; in 1945, 35.8 per cent; but in 1956, only 33.7 per cent. In the twelveyear period 1935-1947 union membership increased fivefold; for the past twelve years
there as been no increase.
"The distribution of union strength is very uneven. The latest figures available
show that, in 1953, 27.2 per cent of the employees in New England's nonagricultural establishments and 39 per cent on the Pacific Coast belonged to unions,
but only 18.3 per cent were members in the South Atlantic states despite the inclusion of the highly organized state of West Virginia. In North Carolina only 8.3
per cent were members, compared with 30.1 per cent in Massachusetts and 35.7 per
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The protection of personal freedom within the factory community,
especially in southern localities, is not only very faint today, but it is
in a very confused state. Instead of proceeding in a policy-wise fashion,
marking out clearly the boundaries of personal and institutional freedom, the Board has followed a staggering ad hoc path of decision
making. In general, it may be said, that the Board has lost sight of
policy and is drifting in a sea of technicalities. No employer really
knows what he can say or'do.240
The protection of personal freedom within an industrial civilization
is the central problem of our times. It is foolish and perhaps suicidal
to pretend that these problems do not exist, that they can be covered
with legal veils designed for a bygone era. We must recognize the
fact that industrial sovereignty has superseded political sovereignty,
and that the industrial plant by the force of circumstances has become
the basic social unit of our industrial cultural, but that it unfortunately
has not yet become a social institution, performing the responsibilities
of the institutions which it has displaced. For only in this way, by
enterprise performing its social, political, and economic responsibilities,
by restoring to the worker his status and function through an industrial
democracy can our industrial society function.
The American system of freedom is on trial today. The corporation as an institution is at the crossroads of history. "For twentiethcentury capitalism will justify itself not only by its out-turn product,
but by its content of life values. Within its organization and impact
are lives of many millions of men; and these lives are the first concern,
not the by-product, of our century. In American thought, an economic
system, like a political government, is made for men. If it denies rights
of men to life as they understand life, or to liberty as they understand
that, or to property, whatever modern property shall turn out to be,
the community gathers itself for a kind of revolt whose results are
unforeseeable."

2

41

The democratic form of government alone holds out to the world
the only hope for freedom, for it alone possesses the structure in which
both the person and the institution can live together in harmony and
freedom. The democratic system is not functioning when the institution
is seducing the person. Peace and freedom will only be achieved when
democracy shall prevail not only in the political order but also in the
industrial order.
240. Wirtz, supra note 192, at 616.
241. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 114

(1954).
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